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Learning to Read in the Theaetetus: The Recuperation of Writing in Plato’s
Philosophy
By
Luke Lea
B.A., Liberal Arts, St. John’s College, 2014
M.A., Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, University of New Mexico, 2018
Abstract
In my thesis, I take up the popular question of the status of writing in Plato’s
dialogues, but from a fresh perspective. Instead of approaching the question of writing
head-on, I attend to the philosophical message about reading presented by two dialogues,
the Phaedrus and the Theaetetus. My thesis offers interpretations of two individual
dialogues whose emphasis on writing and reading as both literary themes and
philosophical problems ensure that the overall meanings of these dialogues cannot be
reached without attention to this subject.
Although I examine the dialogues in isolation, believing that the setting and
characters unique to each dialogue hold the key to understanding the discursive
arguments presented therein, some features nevertheless emerge as common to both the
Phaedrus and the Theaetetus. Specifically, each dialogue explores the virtues of a
radically generous, and perhaps even reverent, style of reading. In the Phaedrus, this
style of reading serves Socrates’ interpretations of traditional myth. I argue that this is an
ironic gesture on the part of Plato, who strives to show that Socrates’ own method of
interpretation, if it is applied to written texts, would be an adequate response to the
criticisms of writing espoused by Socrates. The Theaetetus shows this method of
interpretation in its application to a philosophical text — the Truth of Protagoras. I argue
that as Socrates and Theaetetus attempt to interpret this book, Socrates educates
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Theaetetus in his characteristic method of generous interpretation, and that Socrates’
discursive arguments against Protagoras’ relativism are buttressed by his display of this
hermeneutic method.
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Introduction
The status of writing in Plato’s thought holds interest among scholars for many
reasons. For one, Plato’s criticisms of writing in the Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter
appear to be contravened by his prolific literary output. If philosophy is as resistant to
writing as these Platonic texts claim, why did Plato produce so much philosophical
writing? Secondly, the question of how readers should interpret Plato’s writings in light
of their dialogue form is of the highest importance to both Classicists and Ancient
Philosophers. While the interpretation of a philosophical treatise need do nothing more
than follow the text’s argument, readers of Plato’s dialogues are tasked with something
much more difficult and uncertain: how are we to understand the thought of Plato, a
writer who never speaks in his own voice?
One observation that scholars have frequently made bears on both the problem of
Plato’s self-contradictory written condemnations of writing and the question of how the
dialogues should be interpreted: perhaps the dialogue form was Plato’s answer to the
criticisms of writing expressed in his works. Under this assumption, we have an answer
to the first problem and a hint as to the second. To the first we can say that the failures of
writing enumerated by Plato apply to some forms of written philosophy, but not to the
philosophical dialogue. To the second we can say that Plato’s views may at times differ
sharply from those expressed by the characters in his dialogues, and caution must be
taken before a speech made by Plato’s Socrates, for instance, can be attributed to Plato
himself.
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The following two chapters begin with this observation and then work outward
from it to develop interpretations of the Phaedrus (Chapter 1) and the Theaetetus
(Chapter 2). In each case, the interpretation presented is not a comprehensive reading of
the dialogue, but rather a reading that goes just as far as the dialogue’s involvement with
the question of writing as a philosophical topic will allow. Each chapter follows the
methodological principle that, due to the great variance among Plato’s dialogues in terms
of setting, dramatic date, characters, etc., even a highly accurate reading of a single
dialogue cannot give the final word of Plato’s teaching or position on any particular topic.
One consequence of this principle is that what holds true in the Phaedrus, for example,
may be false or simply irrelevant in the Theaetetus. Therefore, no attempt is made in
what follows to establish the Platonic view on writing, nor even to harmonize the
positions of these two dialogues on the topic. Instead, only internal evidence is used in
interpreting the Phaedrus, and so too for the Theaetetus. Moreover, the views of writing
and reading attributed to Plato in these interpretations do not exclude other Platonic
views that may be expressed in other dialogues.
Nevertheless, the view of writing that I have found in the Phaedrus is largely
consistent with, and even supportive of, the one I have found in the Theaetetus. Although
I do not believe that any of the arguments I make in these two chapters depend on a
particular chronology of the composition or publication of the dialogues, I do contend
that the reader of the Theaetetus may come to a better understanding of that dialogue’s
contribution to the discussion of writing after a close examination of the same topic in the
Phaedrus, which I provide in Chapter 1. The central feature shared by the interpretations
I give of both these dialogues is their emphasis not only on the literary theme or
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philosophical problem of writing, but also on reading. It is likely that Plato’s thoughts on
the status of writing cannot be fully understood until some account has been taken of how
he thought philosophical literature, including his own, should be read.
I argue that the correct practice of reading is a central concern in both the
Phaedrus and the first half of the Theaetetus, and that both dialogues show the virtue of a
method of reading that offers a radical (and yet never dogmatic) reverence to the author
whose thought is being interpreted by the reader. Although this general point stands
prominently in both dialogues, the exact purport differs from one to the other. In the
Phaedrus, I argue, Plato shows Socrates and Phaedrus in the process of interpreting
traditional myth. My interpretation of the dialogue holds that Plato ironically portrays
Socrates as an ideal reader of traditional myth who nevertheless does not see the
possibility that his reverent habits of reading may be applied to written texts. This irony is
Plato’s response to the Socratic criticisms of writing. The same generous method of
interpretation that Socrates extends to traditional myth would, when applied to written
philosophy, save it from Socrates’ rebuke.
In Chapter 2, I argue that the Theaetetus treats the topic of reading along broadly
similar lines, but that in this dialogue, in contrast to the Phaedrus, the generous method
of reading is shown in action in its application to written philosophy as Socrates and
Theaetetus attempt to work out the meaning of Protagoras’ Truth. I argue that in this
dialogue as well, Plato makes a consistent and discernable point, although perhaps a
subtle one, about the virtues of generous reading. Moreover, I argue that the favorable
presentation of this style of reading is crucial for the discursive content of the dialogue.
The relativism of Protagoras requires, and at the same time excludes, the sort of
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sympathetic and generous reading that Socrates gives his text throughout the first half of
the dialogue.

4

Chapter 1: Plato’s Response to Socrates in the Phaedrus
The final section of Plato’s Phaedrus is famous for its critique of written
philosophy (274b-277a). Socrates concludes his conversation with Phaedrus by detailing
the failings of written philosophy and highlighting the superiority of oral discourse. The
critique unfolds in two stages; in the first, Socrates recounts an “Egyptian” myth in which
the ancient god Thamuz presents objections to the proliferation of the newly invented
technology of writing, and in the second Socrates poses objections of his own to certain
uses of letters, especially among philosophers.1 I argue here that the second stage
constitutes an interpretation of the first, and that Plato — by having Socrates demonstrate
a certain method of interpretation through his exegesis of the myth — illuminates the
positive and productive possibilities of the philosophical text.2

Nonetheless, Plato

cautions, the critiques of Thamuz and Socrates must be taken seriously as warnings of the
futilities and dangers of a literary-philosophical culture. The productive possibilities of
the philosophical text are contingent on a process of interpretation similar in key ways to
the one Socrates exercises on the myth of Theuth. Where this correct form of
interpretation is lacking, the criticisms of writing expressed by Thamuz and Socrates
prevail.
Some scholars have distinguished between these two stages, separating the
criticisms of writing attributed to the Egyptian God Thamuz from those Socrates gives
1

Rabbas 2010 argues that the critique of writing in this dialogue primarily concerns written speeches
intended to persuade audiences regarding specific ethical or political matters. While I do not deny that this
is the context out of which the discussion of writing grows, Socrates’ concluding critique of writing has
shifted its focus from the political uses of writing to the philosophical. Comments made at 276c and
following have clear applicability to philosophical topics and activities, but appear foreign to the context of
deliberative oratory. This is also the position of Yunis 2011: 224: “S. makes no attempt to consider writing
and orality comprehensively, but focuses specifically on the transmission of knowledge or wisdom.”
2
Previous scholars have noticed that the Egyptian myth is a story that demands Socrates’ interpretation:
Burger 1978: 115.
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sua voce.3 Others conflate the two stages, attributing all criticisms to Socrates.4 To insist
on the relevance of the distinction between the criticisms of Thamuz and those of
Socrates is not to split hairs, because the Phaedrus explicitly raises the question of how
myth should be treated by the philosopher, both in this specific section of the dialogue
and elsewhere.5 The mythical critiques are thus marked and separated from the
contemporary Socratic critiques. To assume that there is no difference between the
notions expressed mythically and those expressed non-mythically would therefore be
inattentive to one of the dialogue’s most prominent and persistent problems.
In light of this distinction, the question arises what exactly is the relationship
between the objections to writing made by Thamuz in the myth told by Socrates and the
objections made by Socrates himself. In what follows, I try to work out the relationship
between the two sets of criticisms, identifying points of convergence and divergence
between them. Using the results of this analysis, I argue that the second set of objections
(Socrates’ own) is an attempt to interpret the first set (those of Thamuz). The sense in
which I claim that Socrates “interprets” the Egyptian myth is crucial for my reading of
this section of the dialogue, since this process of interpretation is the sine qua non for the
possibility of philosophical literature to transcend the difficulties copiously ascribed to its
use by Thamuz and Socrates. Much of the scholarship on the Phaedrus seeks the
dialogue’s teaching regarding the active role in communication: the proper types of
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Griswold 1986: 207; Benardete 1991: 189.
Hyland 1968; Zwicky 1997.
5
At 229b-230a, Socrates and Phaedrus discuss whether their current location is the same spot from which
legend has it that Oreithuia was whisked off by Boreas. Socrates says the exact spot is somewhat farther on,
but rejects Phaedrus’ interest in the facticity of myth. He proposes that instead of fact-checking the factual
details of traditional stories, one should investigate his own nature in accordance with the Delphic oracle.
Discussions of myth in the Phaedrus are included in Morgan 2000: 210-241, Trabattoni 2012, Zwicky 1997,
and Gottfried 1993. Studies on myth in Plato generally are Morgan 2000 and Brisson 2000; see further
Brisson 2004: 15-28 on Plato’s “attitude toward myth.”
4
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rhetoric and writing, etc. Asmis, for example, explains the unity of the Phaedrus in terms
of psychagogia.6 This chapter attempts to balance out this emphasis on the active role in
philosophical communication by calling attention to the fact that the success of an act of
rhetoric or writing depends on an act of listening or reading. It is one of this chapter’s
primary contentions that Plato sees promising prospects for written philosophy — but
only on the condition that this writing is received by the right type of interpretive reading.
Stated briefly, I argue that Socrates’ method of interpretation consists in treating
traditional myth as a source of wisdom relevant to contemporary concerns and,
afterwards, clarifying the meaning of the myth’s latent wisdom and fleshing it out in
contemporary terms. The example of this method of interpretation discussed below is
Socrates’ interpretation of the myth of Thamuz. Socrates attempts to clarify the insights
of this myth, and then to link them to cultural practices familiar to Phaedrus — drinking
parties and gardening practices, for instance, which are absent in the myth itself — so as
to intensify their meaning for him.
I moreover argue that this method of interpretation that Plato has Socrates employ
in developing Thamuz’ criticisms ironically undermines both sets of criticisms by
showing in action the very method by which philosophical logoi may be liberated from
the supposedly oppressive confines of their textual form. Socrates is not aware that his
interpretive method constitutes a redemptive possibility for reading and writing. This fact
is shown by Plato through his art of authorship, with his characters unawares.7
6

Asmis 1986.
A recent and interesting discussion on a way of reading the Platonic dialogues that would distinguish
sharply between the beliefs of Socrates and those of Plato can be found in Ferrari 2015. Griswold 2002: 87
similarly points to dramatic irony — in which “the author communicates to his or her audience over the
heads, as it were, of the characters in the drama” — as one type of irony in the dialogues. Nehamas 1998:
41-45 details a “Platonic irony” in which the author of the dialogues exposes hypocrisy in their readers who
condemn Socrates’ interlocutors despite sharing in their faults. Finally, Rosen 1968: xxv states that
7
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This study will not yield comprehensive or hard-and-fast answers to the question
of Plato’s “doctrine” regarding written philosophy. The Platonic dialogues (and letters)
address the topic of writing in diverse contexts and with diverse content. No attempt is
made in this analysis to harmonize the various notes struck in these diverse discussions.
What I do hope to achieve is to establish a new starting point from which to approach the
question of writing in the Phaedrus.8 This starting point will be sensitive to certain
questions that Plato himself raises in writing the Phaedrus and treats throughout the
dialogue. Among the most important are the questions of how the extra-logical aspects of
a logos should influence its interpretation. That is, can the source of a logos be used to
discredit it? Is a logos with a long tradition superior to a novel one? How can a written
logos combine wisdom and techne? And, finally, how do these various factors influence
the act of interpretation?9 I hope to show that these questions lie at the heart of this
section of the Phaedrus, and that the answers suggested therein are crucial to
understanding Plato’s great ironic gesture of launching a powerful condemnation of
written philosophy in a work of philosophical literature.

“Platonic irony means that every statement in a dialogue must be understood in terms of its dramatic
context.” While I am in complete agreement with Rosen, I see the possibility that Plato may have used each
of these modes of irony, and I take no stand here on which is most characteristic of his corpus. My claim is
limited to the Phaedrus, in which I believe Plato ascribes to his character Socrates a certain negative view
of writing which he, Plato, undercuts through the display of a manner of reading which should allay the
concerns of Socrates.
8
Chapter 2 of this thesis will, however, apply the framework for understanding the question of writing in
the Phaedrus developed in Chapter 1 to another dialogue. I argue that this is justified by the similar way in
which the issue of textual interpretation is raised in the two dialogues, but I stop short of claiming either
that this is the final word on writing and reading for Plato or that the two dialogues announce the very same
message regarding these questions. As a single example of the many salient differences between the
treatment of reading in Phaedrus and the Theaetetus, it should be noted that in the Phaedrus Socrates
seems skeptical of a generous and immanent hermeneutics of the text (despite himself applying one to
traditional myth), while in the Theaetetus he seems to instruct Theaetetus in this same art.
9
The tantalizing prospect of something both wise and technical is adumbrated at 273b, where Socrates
ironically credits the legendary rhetorical theorist Tisias with having discovered something σοφὸν ἅµα καὶ
τεχνικόν (“at once wise and technical”).
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Chapter Overview

My argument proceeds in four steps. I begin by identifying the main contentions
made by Thamuz and Socrates about writing, seeking to show that Socrates “interprets”
the myth, by recognizing the wisdom within it and attempting to transfer it to his (and
Phaedrus’) own context. Socrates attempts to accomplish this by separating the core of
the myth’s spirit and thought from the contingent trappings of its situation and adapting
this core to present circumstances, language, and social realities. These are the shared
aims of the chapter’s first two sections: “An ‘Egyptian’ Myth” and “A Socratic Exegesis.”
The chapter’s third section, “The Source of a Logos” steps back from its
investigation of Socrates’ art of interpretation to consider Plato’s authorial purpose in
presenting such an art of reading in a dialogue that questions the value of writing. This
section identifies a tension between the Thamuzian and the Socratic position on the
relevance of the source of a logos, and argues that this tension, irresolvable by recourse to
any of the dialogue’s “official doctrines” was constructed to alert the reader to the
importance of the question on which Thamuz and Socrates disagree. The Logoi we
investigate all appear to come from a particular type of source. How that source is
construed by the interpreter has important influences on the resulting interpretation.
The chapter’s fourth section “Time and Space Influence” offers an original
interpretation of what the Phaedrus has to say about the role of space and time in writing,
philosophical communication, and understanding and contrasts two attitudes of
interpretation displayed in the dialogue: one by Socrates (which we have argued provides
the possibility for the philosophical text to be a useful thing) and one by Phaedrus.
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The fifth and final section of the chapter “Literature as a Storehouse of Wisdom”
ties together threads from the previous four and offers some concluding support for my
central thesis, which is that Plato, through his display of Socrates’ method of interpreting
traditional myth, gestures toward optimistic vistas for the role of literature in philosophy.
However, this section also argues that Plato was sensitive to the risk of traditionalism in
Socrates’ method, a trend in reading that poses as great a danger to the viability of
philosophical literature as does an unnecessarily critical hermeneutics. I respond to this
problem by referring the prevalent scholarly opinion that Plato’s dialogues were written
in a manner specifically and meticulously crafted to avert this danger.

I. An Egyptian Myth
I begin by stating and analyzing Socrates’ “Egyptian myth,” with which the
Phaedrus’ criticism of writing begins. Because many detailed points of language from
the myth will be of interest to this chapter, it deserves to be quoted in full (274c-275b):10
[Σωκράτης.] Ἤκουσα τοίνυν περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῆς Αἰγύπτου γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ
παλαιῶν τινα θεῶν οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον ἱερὸν ὃ δὴ καλοῦσιν ἶβιν: αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνοµα τῷ
δαίµονι εἶναι Θεύθ. τοῦτον δὴ πρῶτον ἀριθµόν τε καὶ λογισµὸν εὑρεῖν καὶ
γεωµετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονοµίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεττείας τε καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράµµατα.
βασιλέως δ’ αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαµοῦ περὶ τὴν µεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ
ἄνω τόπου ἣν οἱ Ἓλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἄµµωνα,
παρὰ τοῦτον ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεὺθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξεν, καὶ ἔφη δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς
ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις. ὁ δὲ ἤρετο ἥντινα ἑκάστη ἔχοι ὠφελίαν, διεξιόντος δέ, ὅτι
καλῶς ἢ µὴ καλῶς δοκοῖ λέγειν, τὸ µέν ἔψεγεν, τὸ δ’ ἐπῄνει. πολλὰ µὲν δὴ περὶ
ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ’ ἀµφότερα Θαµοῦν τῷ Θεὺθ λέγεται ἀποφήνασθαι, ἃ
λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράµµασιν ἦν, “τοῦτο δὲ, ὦ
βασιλεῦ, τὸ µάθηµα,” ἔφη ὁ Θεύθ, “σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ µηµονικωτέρους
παρέξει· µνήµης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρµακον ηὑρέθη.” ὁ δ’ εἶπεν· “ὦ
τεχνικώτατε Θεύθ, ἄλλος µὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι τίν’ ἔχει
µοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς µέλλουσι χρῆσθαι· καὶ νῦν σύ, πατὴρ ὢν
γραµµάτων, δι’ εὔνοιαν τοὐναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν µαθόντων
λήθην µὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει µνήµης ἀµελητησίᾳ, ἃτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν
10

Here and elsewhere I have followed Burnet’s 1903 OCT text of the Phaedrus. Translations are my own.
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ὑπ’ ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς ὑφ’ αὑτῶν
ἀναµιµνησκοµένους· οὔκουν µνήµης ἀλλὰ ὑποµνήσεως φάρµακον ηὗρες. σοφίας
δὲ τοῖς µαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν προίζεις· πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόµενοι
ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώµονες εἶναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώµονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες
καὶ χαλεποὶ συνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.”
[Socrates:] I heard, then, that there was in Naukratis, in Egypt, one of the old gods
there, whose holy bird was the one they call the ibis and Theuth was this deity’s
name. And that he first discovered number and calculation and geometry and
astronomy but also checkers and dice and finally letters. But the king of all of
Egypt then, which surrounded the great city above the place which the Greeks call
Egyptian Thebes, was Thamuz and they call the god Ammon. After approaching
this god, Theuth displayed his inventions, and he said that they needed to be given
to the other Egyptians. But Thamuz asked what sort of benefit each had, and with
Theuth going through them, Thamuz said what seemed to him good and what
didn’t, and he blamed some inventions and praised others. Thamuz is said to have
declared many things concerning each invention on both sides to Theuth, which it
would require a long speech to recount. But when he got up to letters, Theuth said
“This, king, will make the Egyptians wiser and more capable of memory; for a
drug of memory and wisdom has been discovered.” But Thamuz said, “Theuth so
very technical, one man is able to create technological things, but another is able
to judge what share of harm and help they have for those who will use them; and
now you, since you are the father of letters, say the opposite of their potential on
account of partiality. For they will produce forgetfulness in the souls of their
learners due to negligence of their memories, since they are reminded because of
their trust in writing by outside strokes from other people, not by themselves from
inside; therefore, you have found not a drug of memory, but of reminding. Αnd
you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not a true wisdom. For
becoming well read without instruction, they will think that they are learned,
despite being unlearned for the most part, and difficult to associate with, having
turned into apparently clever men rather than wise ones.
Our first task is to characterize precisely what Thamuz has to say about writing.
But it should first be noted that his criticism of writing is not generated in a vacuum, but
is supported by a narrative structure of its own, complete with details of setting and
character that may be of importance in the interpretation of the myth. For one, Theuth’s
criticism of writing is necessarily hypothetical. At the time Thamuz shares his negative
opinion of letters with Theuth, these letters have not yet been proliferated among humans.
Therefore, the consequences of literacy that Thamuz envisions are theoretical likelihoods
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rather than empirical facts.11 This context of Theuth’s “primary orality”12 contrasts with
the situation of Socrates, who had some empirical knowledge about the consequences of
literacy in Greece, but it contrasts even more with the situation of Plato,13 in whose
generation the uses of writing and reading among the Greeks increased dramatically.14
Having established the speculative nature of Theuth’s criticisms, we now turn to
those criticisms themselves. What are the specific concerns that lead Thamuz to his
negative opinion of writing? His argument begins with a general point: one who is skilled
in discovering new inventions is not necessarily qualified to judge their effects: ὦ
τεχνικώτατε Θεύθ, ἄλλος µὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι τίν’ ἔχει µοῖραν
βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς µέλλουσι χρῆσθαι, (“Theuth so very technical, one man is
able to create technological things, but another is able to judge what share of harm and
help they have for those who will use them” [274e]).
Thamuz begins his response to Theuth addressing him in the vocative along with
the adjective τεχνικώτατε (“so very technical”). This adjective and the ability to produce
arts to which it refers contrasts sharply with the domain of judgment that Thamuz
reserves for himself — the ability to discern what is harmful or beneficial for human
beings. As Thamuz sees it, he himself is the expert on human matters, despite all the
technical expertise of Theuth. This is a division picked up by Socrates in his
11

Derrida 1981: 76 discusses the suitability of orality to a king-god such as Thamuz. A contrary position is
taken by Smith 2002. Rosen 1987: 56 takes Derrida to task for lacking a sensitivity to “theological
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interpretation of the myth, and of interest also to Plato in the composition of the dialogue.
The question is whether writing, with a sort of technological tunnel vision, has developed
to serve its own interests and to prove its own cleverness and in doing so has lost sight of
human nature and its benefit. Socrates seems to ally himself with Thamuz as a student of
human nature and to associate Theuth with Phaedrus, whose infatuation with technology
and cleverness leads to neglect of what is useful and harmful for humans.15 Plato, on the
other hand, shows that it is the use to which writing is put, rather than the bare
technology itself, that will determine benefit or harm for its users.
Thamuz’ opening statement, then, assigns knowledge of technical matters to
Theuth and knowledge of human matters to Thamuz. But it gives another reason why
Theuth is unqualified to judge the effects of his invention: the creator may be biased
toward his own discoveries as a father is to his child. The notion of personal bias, be it
authorial, paternal, or cultural looms large in this section of the dialogue. It will be argued
later that a certain type of bias is a necessary ingredient, in Plato’s view, for the
redemption of the philosophical text.16 Thamuz uses the word εὔνοια (“partiality”) to
express his concern about paternal bias. This question of the role of partiality in reading
and interpretation is a critical one for this section of the dialogue. I have translated the
word to mean “partiality,” since this is the purport of Thamuz’ statement. But another
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See 238a-238b, where Socrates correctly guesses that Phaedrus has listened many times (πολλάκις) to
Lysias’ speech, and then, when merely listening has proven insufficient, takes the book to continue his
activity. The technology of writing appears dangerous as an unreflective repetition of the same.
16
Thamuz’ observation of the role of paternal bias is just one example of the more general fact that
expectations and interests structure our experience (especially our reading experiences) and, at least to
some degree, determine their result. It is true that as the father of letters, Theuth’s interest predisposes him
to hold a positive opinion about them. However, Thamuz’ analysis of bias is not keen enough to see his
own, or at least not to reveal it. Readers of the dialogue must ask what conditions have predisposed
Thamuz to hold a negative opinion of writing, and whether his critical impulse is in the end preferable to
the paternal bias he condemns.
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possible meaning is “goodwill.” I argue below that Plato proposes a manner of reading
which maintains goodwill without devolving into partiality.
Having called attention to the problem of bias in Theuth’s judgment of his own
discoveries, Thamuz voices his first concern: memory will be damaged by writing. The
benefit of writing that Theuth claims will help memory consists only in awareness-in-aninstant of facts, but according to Thamuz, this is not remembering but being reminded.
Remembering depends on a faculty whereby insight is generated from inside. Writing
provides a shortcut to a simulacrum of these insights, but it does not exercise the faculty
of memory itself, since it depends on external artifacts. Writing, Thamuz warns, will
therefore replace memory and lead to its atrophy through neglect. So the first division on
which Thamuz’ critique depends is that of internal/external.
The critique proceeds with the help of another division: appearance/reality.
Thamuz worries that literature will allow voracious readers to pose as wise men, although
their reading will not constitute true wisdom.17 The specific negative effect of this named
by Thamuz is that these wise-appearing men will be difficult to be with. The verb
συνεῖναι meaning “to be with” is standard for the teacher-student relationship.18 Thamuz
worries that writing will damage the social future of pedagogy by alienating teachers
from students. The latter will not see the need for the former, thinking themselves already
to have become wise from books. Thamuz voices a concern that was surely on the mind
of many fifth-century Athenians. Robb directly links the decline of συνουσία as the
predominant paideutic system in fifth-century Athens to the increase in the use of
17

Dean-Jones 2003 explains a similar phenomenon in the medical field. The rise of medical texts led to
self-educated charlatans posing as experts trained in medical practice by teachers.
18
See, for instance, LSJ 1996: 1705, s.v. συνέιµι, definition II.3, and cf. Plato Apology 25e, Theatetus 151a,
168a, etc. For discussions of the use of this word by Plato to denote pedagogical relationships, see also
Robb 1993 and Sayre 1995: 220-222.
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educational texts.19 Once the knowledge on which “the culture’s major institutions
depend” has been committed to text, there is, anthropologically speaking, no need for
pedagogic συνουσία.20 I argue here that Plato, but not his Socrates, foresees the
possibility of a συνουσία capable of surviving the transfer of cultural knowledge from
psychic to textual storage-spaces and from oral to literary means of transmission; the
intimacy of the relationship can be maintained as long as readers view time-tested books
as sources of wisdom and instruction differing little from human mentors. However, for a
generation of readers who have grown hubristic about their own ability to self-educate
through the text — a generation I take to be represented by Phaedrus in this dialogue —
συνουσία will truly have died away.21
The foregoing can be summed up as one procedural point about who can and
cannot evaluate, and two hypothetical consequences of writing, each of which depends on
a division. The procedural point is that a creator cannot judge his work objectively due to
his paternal bias. It should be noted that this issue will be developed by Socrates in a
different direction; a teacher is able to evaluate the needs of a student, while a text,
impartial as it may be toward its reader, says only the same thing to everyone.
The first consequence is that writing will weaken memory, since true memory
depends on an internal process, but writing replaces this process with reliance on the
external. The second consequence is that writing will threaten teacher-student pedagogy
by fostering apparent wisdom while doing nothing to promote real wisdom.

19
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Robb 1993: 82-83.
Robb 1993: 83.

Again see 238a-238b, where Phaedrus is said to have left behind hearing Lysias for
reading his text. This is a case of the technology of writing replacing συνουσία.
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II. A Socratic Exegesis
So much for the content of Socrates’ Egyptian myth. Socrates follows this myth
with a new set of criticisms of writing presented as his own. Intervening between Thamuz’
critique and Socrates’ is a brief digression on myth to which we will return later. Socrates’
critique of writing is similar to Thamuz’, but it omits some points made by Thamuz,
supplies some points that the myth lacks, and differs in its overall emphasis. I propose
that the relationship of the original myth (274c-275b) to Socrates’ additions to it (275c277a) is that of text to interpretation. Socrates assumes that there is truth in the myth
because of its traditional status,22 and he undertakes to clarify the main points of the myth
and to transfer their meaning to his current time and place. This method of interpretation,
I argue, is Plato’s attempt to articulate the conditions under which philosophical literature
may avoid the problems enumerated by Thamuz and Socrates.
Socrates begins with what appears to be a paraphrase of Thamuz’ first negative
consequence of writing — the deterioration of memory — even though he does not
mention this particular consequence explicitly. Instead, he remarks that a written speech
can do nothing other than remind the one who already knows about the things the speech
concerns (275c):
[Σωκράτης·] οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόµενος ἐν γράµµασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ ὁ
παραδεχόµενος ὥς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραµµάτων ἐσόµενον, πολλῆς ἂν
εὐηθείας γέµοι καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὴν Ἄµµωνος µαντείαν ἀγνοοῖ, πλέον τι οἰόµενος εἶναι
λόγους γεγραµµένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑποµνῆσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾖ τὰ γεγραµµένα.
[Socrates:] Then whoever thinks he can leave behind an art in writing, and on the
other side whoever supposes that there will be something clear and stable from
writing, would be foolish with lots of simple-mindedness, and really would be
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Regardless of whether the myths actually do belong to cultural traditions or are invented ad hoc, it is
their presentation as traditional myths in the dialogue, and not their real historical origins in Plato’s mind,
that determine Socrates’ hermeneutical approach to them in the Phaedrus.
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ignorant of Ammon’s prophecy, if he thinks that written speeches can do anything
more than remind the knower about the things the writing concerns.
Instead of following Thamuz in focusing on the external/internal division and
drawing on its basis a distinction between memory and reminding, Socrates seems to
focus on an inherent defect in writing as a tool of communication: writing is made out to
be a murky medium in which no τέχνη can be left behind by the writer and from which
nothing σαφὲς καὶ βεβαίον (“clear and lasting”) can be extracted by the reader (275c).
Thus, Socrates takes the original point of Thamuz, which deals with the effects of writing
on memory, and then develops it into an original point determined by his own interest in
writing as a philosopher. The precise content of the critique is changed, but the general
spirit and purpose of the Thamuz’ anxiety about the effects of writing on memory are
preserved in Socrates’ lamentation of the difficulties writing poses for communication,
and his continued attention to the relation between writing and memory.23
Next come a pair of original additions to the discussion. Writing is compared to
painting, because the letters of the former appear to speak knowingly, just as the animals
of the former appear to be alive (275d-e).
Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅµοιον ζωγραφίᾳ. καὶ
γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἕστηκε µὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι, σεµνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ.
ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις µὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι
ἔρῃ τῶν λεγοµένων βουλόµενος µαθεῖν, ἕν τι σηµαίνει µόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί. ὅταν δὲ
ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται µὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁµοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν, ὡς
δ' αὕτως παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ µή.
πληµµελούµενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται
βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὔτ' ἀµύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὑτῷ.
For I suppose, Phaedrus, that writing has this terrible quality, and that it is truly
similar to painting. For the figures of this art stand as though they are living, but if
someone asks a question, they are silent with great seriousness. And speeches are
23
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the same way. You would think that they say something as if they know about it,
but if you ask a question about the things they say, wishing to learn, they always
say only the same one thing. And whenever it is written once, the whole speech
whirl about everywhere, equally among those in the know and among those the
speech does not concern at all, and it does not know to whom it should speak and
to whom it should not. And when it is wronged and unjustly rebuked, it always
lacks the help of its father. For the speech itself is able neither to defend nor to
help itself.
If these letters are questioned, the letters will say the same thing always — ἕν τι σηµαίνει
µόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί (this point will be discussed further below). Secondly, the product of
writing does not know how to discern its proper audience. It speaks alike to the people to
whom it is fitting to speak, and to the others.24 Furthermore, it cannot defend itself, and
when it is wronged it requires the assistance of its father (275e).
Then the subject changes from a direct criticism of writing to a comparison
between writing and speech. The vehicle for this comparison is the language of lineage
and descent. The spoken word is the legitimate brother of the bastard written word (276a).
[ΣΩ·] Τί δ'; ἄλλον ὁρῶµεν λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται,
καὶ ὅσῳ ἀµείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται;
[ΦΑΙ.] Τίνα τοῦτον καὶ πῶς λέγεις γιγνόµενον;
[ΣΩ.] Ὃς µετ' ἐπιστήµης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ µανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς µὲν
ἀµῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήµων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ.
[ΦΑΙ.] Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔµψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραµµένος
εἴδωλον ἄν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως.
[So:] What then? Do we see another speech — the legitimate brother of this one,
how it is generated, and how much better and more potent it is than this?
[Phae:] What is this, and how do you say it is generated?
[So:] The speech written with knowledge in the soul of the learner, both able to
defend itself and knowledgeable of how to speak and be silent to the right people.
[Phae:] You must mean the speech of the knower, living and ensouled, of which
the written speech could rightly be called an image.
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This is the harshest language Socrates uses in his criticism of writing. Again, Socrates’
development, expansion, and inflection of points originally made by Thamuz, all done
without modifying the spirit or underlying core of the original, can all be observed in this
case. Where Thamuz was harshest on with Theuth, the former criticized the latter of a
paternal bias that clouded his vision. Socrates takes this as his cue for a number of
similarly harsh comments on fatherhood, lineage, and the written word.
What follows is a parable about a farmer (276b-276d). An intelligent farmer (ὁ
νοῦν ἒχων γεωργός) will not plant his most coveted seeds in quick-working soil,
expectant of quick gratification. Instead he will plant these seeds in long-working but
deep-nourishing soil, reserving the quick-working soil for the use of pleasure and
festivals and the long-working soil for his serious business (ἐφ’ οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακεν). But
the man with pieces of knowledge (ἐπιστήµας, 276c) about the just, good, and beautiful is
certainly even more intelligent than any farmer, so he likewise will not entrust these
pieces of knowledge to writing, but if he writes it will be for the sake of play and as a
reminder for himself in case his old age approaches forgetfulness, and for those who
follow in the same path. Writing should therefore be done for the sake of play rather than
serious business, but it is a worthy pastime when compared to other sorts, such as
drinking parties (276b-d).
But writing without knowledge, while better than drinking parties, is still inferior
to dialectical practices which include knowledge, Socrates reminds Phaedrus. Speeches
implanted with knowledge in a suitable soul are able to help their planter, and they
produce offspring of their own, from which other speeches come to be in other people,
capable of immortality. And the possession of these speeches is the greatest happiness

19

possible in human life (276e-277a). This legitimate offspring is set up in opposition to,
writing, its illegitimate sibling (276a).25
Lebeck’s reading of the Phaedrus uses the language of plant-growth, which is
shared between this section of the dialogue and the description of the growth of wings in
the lover from Socrates’ palinode (251c-251d) as justification for reading the two
sections together.26 The striking result of this pairing is the realization that εὐδαιµονία
attends both the possessor of the “true Eros” and the possessor of the “true Logos” (the
former is mentioned at 253c and 256d, the latter at 277a). Earlier in the dialogue, then,
happiness has been connected to eros. When happiness is mentioned alongside logos,
especially as the latter has just been the subject of a torrent of metaphorical language
involving sexual reproduction, one is naturally led to wonder whether, in Plato’s view, a
proper engagement with logos must be erotic. This question will be taken up in section
five of this chapter.
Socrates’ critique of writing can be summarized thus: writing is a murky medium
in which clear communication is not possible. It appears intelligent, but is not, and does
not respond intelligently to questions. It cannot defend itself. It is not selective in whom it
speaks to. It is inferior on several counts to spoken discourse — it is playful while the
other is serious, bastard where the other is legitimate, indiscriminate where the other is
selective, quick-working and impermanent where the other is fruitful, self-reproducing,
and immortal.
25

The difference between legitimate and illegitimate speeches is operative too in the
Theaetetus’ image of Socrates as midwife (149a-151d). In the Phaedrus, knowledge and
the presence of the author are what separate legitimate from illegitimate speeches. In the
Theaetetus, the art of dialectical questioning is required to test for the legitimacy of a
logos.
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There are, of course, many areas of overlap shared between Thamuz’ critique of
writing and Socrates’. Notable in each is the relationship of writing to memory. Thamuz,
responding to Theuth’s advertisement of writing as a µνήµης φάρµακον (“drug of
memory”), insists that writing will actually damage µνήµη while promoting its shortcut
version, ὑποµνήσις (“reminding”). The latter term, consisting of a compound of the
former with the prefix ὑπο-, seems to be a weakened or defective variant of the latter.
Meanings of ὑποµνήσις such as “suggest” and “mention,” indicate a power related to
memory, but one that is weaker and less direct than the faculty proper, not to mention
external (ἔξωθεν) whereas memory works from within (ἔνδοθεν), to return to the division
of Thamuz.27 Socrates follows up on Thamuz’ language of memory by claiming that
writing does nothing other than remind one who already knows about the things which
the writing concerns (ὑποµνῆσαι, 274e), and by further claiming that ὑποµνήµατα, or
reminders, are the proper form for philosophical writing to take. The language Socrates
uses to express his own thoughts on writing, and the spirit in which he does so, is
therefore derivative of — and interpretive of — the language and spirit of the first set of
criticisms given.
Socrates’ critique also echoes that of Thamuz by questioning the effect of writing
on philosophical pedagogy, but this aspect of Thamuz’ critique is imitated less directly by
Socrates than the µνήµη/ὑποµνήσις division. While the Egyptian case against the
usefulness of writing uses discourse to question its impact on philosophical pedagogy,
Plato repeats the point through action by showing the dynamics of the pedagogical
relationship of Socrates to Phaedrus. Thamuz predicts the deterioration of the teacherstudent relationship as a result of writing. The Phaedrus opens with a depiction of its
27
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titular character engrossed to an unhealthy degree in the literal words of Lysias’ speech
(228a-c).28 Phaedrus is thus an example of the πολυήκοοι who has become χαλεπὸν
συνεῖναι (275a-b). Thinking wrongly that he has become wise from his readings, the
difficulty Phaedrus presents as a philosophical pupil is evident in two ways. First,
Socrates is unable to connect with Phaedrus at the beginning of the dialogue through
dialectic. In order to communicate with his student, Socrates must descend to Phaedrus’
level of interest — which is limited to oratory — by performing a pair of speeches, one of
which Socrates proceeds to disavow in full.
It is only after connecting with Phaedrus on the latter’s own level that Socrates is
able to engage in true dialectic with him. Had Phaedrus not been distracted by his own
grammatophilia, Socrates could have engaged philosophically with Phaedrus from the
very beginning. On a darker note, Phaedrus proves too difficult for Socrates’ συνουσία
with him to have a positive effect, even by the dialogue’s end. After two critiques of
writing, each of which emphasized the distinction between internal and external
recollection and the superiority of the former, Phaedrus still asks Socrates to “remind”
him of what the two have discussed.29 Socrates needs not repeat Thamuz’ second
consequence of writing — the spoiling of the potential philosophical pupil — because the
very conversation in which he could have done so serves as an example of that same
consequence. Perhaps this is not a conscious act of interpretation on the part of Socrates,
but an authorial maneuver by Plato, who always seems to match Socrates with un-
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philosophic or even anti-philosophic interlocutors.30 Nevertheless, Socrates’ criticism of
writing, through acting out the socio-pedagogical dangers it poses to philosophers,
continues this interpretation of Thamuz’ critique by developing it and appropriating it to
his own personal situation — that is, his conversation with Phaedrus.

III. The Source of a Logos
A final similarity between the two sets of critiques — one that concerns what I
call “the source of a logos” — must be pointed out. This notion of the source will then
serve as a bridge to a discussion of “tradition” as the grounds for the possibility of literary
philosophy as I believe Plato establishes in this dialogue. My method in this section
contrasts with that of much recent scholarship on Plato, which often attributes
contradictions in the text to poor writing or thought on Plato’s part. In particular,
contradictions dealing with the subject of writing in the Phaedrus are seen by
deconstructive readers to result from the necessary ambiguities and paradoxes that arise
from the irony of a written condemnation of writing.31 Alternatively, I understand
contradiction to be a powerful literary device for the raising of difficult questions and the
emphatic presentation of central themes. While it is certainly possible that Plato nods
here and there in his dialogues, some scholars have counted Plato among a small number
of talented writers who may write beneath the surface of their text, using apparent
contradictions or inconsistencies to spur the reader toward the author’s intended
thought.32 It is therefore prudent to treat a given contradiction not as a mistake, but as an
invitation for deeper inquiry.

30

Griswold 1988: 147; Griswold 2008: 215.
Derrida 1981: 95; Smith 2002: 74; Ferrari 1987: 207.
32
A small sample would include Bolotin 1987: 40; Griswold 1986: 10; Roochnik 1988: 187-189.
31

23

This final similarity between Thamuz’ and Socrates’ critiques does not deal with
their content, but with the status of each critic as a questionable source for the opinions
he espouses. Both Thamuz and Socrates speak out against writing despite a limited
knowledge of the topic that each owes either to his own illiteracy (Thamuz) or his own
refusal to write (Socrates).33 Thamuz condemns writing before the invention has taken
hold, and he himself has not been instructed in the art. The Egyptian god betrays his
cultural bias against the written word by describing the δοξόσοφοι not as those who have
read much, but as those who have heard much (πολυήκοοι). It is true that the adjective
πολυήκοος could describe one who has “heard” other people reading aloud. Because
reading in the ancient world was typically done aloud,34 a reader could accurately be
called a hearer of the text.35 Nonetheless, when writing is being explicitly contrasted with
speech, the conflation of “readers” and “hearers” exposes a troublesome diremption
between, on the one hand, the conceptual categories and terms Thamuz applies in his
critique of writing and, on the other hand, the nature of reading and writing, which is
clearly foreign and inadequately grasped by these concepts and terms.36
Socrates famously left no written works behind, and it has been suggested that the
criticism of writing Plato puts in his mouth at the end of the Phaedrus is meant to
approximate the views he held historically.37 Whatever the relationship between the
views of the historical Socrates and those of Plato’s Socrates on writing, the latter’s
33
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criticisms of writing in the Phaedrus are a plausible justification for any philosopher,
including the historical Socrates, to choose to abstain from letters. Although Socrates is
more familiar than Thamuz with the empirical consequences of literacy, he, like the
Egyptian god, condemns writing from the outside, as one who does not personally use the
new technology. Socrates’ lack of familiarity with the practice of writing leads to at least
one untrue claim he makes about it; Socrates posits that a piece of writing, when
interrogated, says the same one thing each time (275d). This is true from the outside view,
but anyone who reads frequently will attest that while the words of a text remain the same,
their meaning is highly variable from one reading — and from one reader — to the next.
Moreover, the results of an act of reading are highly dependent on what one expects to
find in reading. Socrates displays an awareness that this truism holds for oral discourse at
260a, but he seems unwilling to extend it to written texts near the end of the dialogue
(260a):
Οὔτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος εἶναι δεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν µή τι
λέγωσι.
Then surely the speech must not be tossed aside, Phaedrus, which the wise speak,
but instead one must scrutinize whether they are saying something.
This is precisely the deportment that, possessed by a reader, could save writing from the
Socratic condemnation it meets at the conclusion of the dialogue. A reader who
recognizes that literature may contain a sort of wisdom that can only be extracted by
close investigation (σκοπεῖν) is unlikely to wrongly consider himself wise. A book
approached by a reader of this sort would not be suited for the Adonis gardens of writing,
but would merit the greatest care of the writer, a care which Plato is reported to have

25

taken in composing his own dialogues, even against the advice he has Socrates utter in
the Phaedrus.38
At any rate, Socrates appears to have underestimated the impact that various
interpretive strategies may have on the meaning of a text, and this is perhaps just one
blind spot about writing that can be attributed to his own limited experience as a writer.
Under different circumstances, the lack of experience that Thamuz and Socrates have as
readers and writers might not be of great importance to their critiques. But in the
“Egyptian” myth, Thamuz explicitly raises the issue of whether the source of a logos is a
legitimate consideration in determining the validity of the logos, and this fact serves to
accentuate the ineluctable irony present in comments on writing made by a pair of
illiterates. Thamuz raises the issue of the source of a logos by claiming that Theuth, as the
father of writing, has a distorted vision of its nature that leads to an exaggerated appraisal
of its uses (275a). The issue of the source of a logos persists beyond the myth in which it
appears. After Socrates finishes relating this myth, Phaedrus reacts by ridiculing the
philo-mythic Socrates and suggesting that the myth is of no great account because of its
impugnable origins:
ΦΑΙ· Ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποὺς ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς.
PHA: Socrates, how easily you make Egyptian speeches, or speeches from
wherever you wish.
Socrates understands this comment as an indictment against the value of myth as
such. He defends myth by maintaining that the source of a logos cannot be taken as a
sufficient reason for rejecting the logos itself (275b):
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[ΣΩ·] Οἱ δέ γ’, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου ἰερῷ δρυὸς λόγους ἔφησαν
µαντικοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι. Τοῖς µὲν οὖν τότε, ἅτε οὐκ οὖσι σοφοῖς ὥσπερ
ὑµεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ’ εὐηθείας, εἰ µόνον ἀληθῆ
λέγοιεν. σοὶ δ’ ἴσως διαφέρει τίς ὁ λέγων καὶ ποδαπός. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο µόνον
σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει.
[SO:] But, dear friend, those at the temple of Zeus of Dodona said that speeches
from a tree were the first prophetic ones to occur. For those men of old, because
they were not wise like you young men now, it was sufficient to listen even to a
rock because of their simplicity, if only it told the truth. But perhaps it matters to
you who the speaker is and from where. For you do not look at this alone, whether
the speech is this way or another.
Plato therefore presents two mutually contradictory viewpoints in this passage
concerning the relevance of the source of a logos in determining its validity. To justify
myth as a source of truth, he has Socrates claim that the source of a logos is irrelevant as
long as the content is true. Yet within the very myth that this line of argument was
advanced to defend, he has Thamuz question the suitability of Theuth to judge his own
invention due to paternal bias. Thus, Thamuz takes a position opposite to that of Socrates:
logoi may in fact be rejected as invalid based on their source. Phaedrus therefore finds
himself in a logical bind. If he agrees with Thamuz that the source of a logos can be used
to dismiss it, then he must put no stock in what Thamuz says, since the Egyptian myth is
of dubious provenance, and possibly even a spurious invention of Socrates. If he instead
agrees with Socrates that the content of a logos cannot be dismissed simply because its
source is unreliable, then he must also disagree with Socrates, who states (through
Thamuz) that Theuth’s defense of writing is illegitimate due to paternal bias.
The result is a subtle but powerful aporia. If we agree with Thamuz, then we must
also disagree, and so too with Socrates. This aporia goes unnoticed by Phaedrus, who
wishes blithely to agree with both. Although the paradoxical impasse created by Socrates’
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myth is subtle, it stands out in its context as an example of a type of writing that naturally
resists dogmatic appropriation by the δοξόσοφοι. Expository writing lends itself to
dogmatic interpretation, but a type of writing that presents contradictory viewpoints
without mediating between them, while perhaps instilling dogmatic misconceptions in
some, would send another message to more sensitive readers: the characters in this
discussion have hit upon an important question, but it cannot be decided on the basis of
the arguments they give pro and con.39 Refuge must be taken in supplementary evidence
— from deeper inside the dialogue or from outside its bounds.
This is the move Plato makes on the question of the relevance of the source of a
λόγος; the question cannot be decided on the basis of the arguments given by Socrates
and Thamuz, yet it is still necessary to answer. I argue that Plato provides an illustration
for how the question of the source of a logos can be approached in his literary depiction
of the Socratic art of interpretation. Socrates’ method of interpretation, which hinges on
his view of myth as a source of wisdom, shows that the source of a logos, or more
accurately, the apparent source of a logos, is a matter of consequence insofar as it
determines our treatment of the logos. Because Socrates is willing to extend the benefit of
the doubt to traditional myth as a culturally authorized source of wisdom, and by looking
at it carefully to see whether it actually says something true (260a), he is able to extract
the core of the spirit and thought the myth contains, and adapt it his own particular
circumstances. Phaedrus, on the other hand, because he approaches myth as something to
be debunked, challenged, or ridiculed, finds in it merely the occasion for caviling. These
contrasting styles of interpretation are given fuller description in the subsequent section.
39

I therefore agree with the stance of Yunis 2003b: 211-212 that the difficulties of a Platonic text require a
reader to read critically, but I do not follow him to the conclusion that this should be done “without
contemplating the absent author.”
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IV. Time- and Space-Influence
What does the source of a logos have to do with writing? If we acknowledge that
Socrates sees myth as a source of wisdom, containing logoi worthy of study and
investigation, but that the younger generation of which Phaedrus is the dialogue’s
representative sneers at myth as a relic of a bygone era, we are well positioned to
understand the anxiety that motivates Socrates’ criticism of written philosophy. Socrates
fears that writing, by its association with the generation of Phaedrus that is enlightened
by technology but bereft of wisdom, will not be a strong enough medium to protect what
is truly wise. Writing is not suited to philosophy, Socrates warns, because philosophy
concerns itself with wisdom, and those who read and write are not sensitive in these
matters. This is where, I believe, Plato disagrees. By putting the Socratic art of
interpretation on display, Plato shows that Socrates’ treatment of myth as a source of
wisdom is a spirit of interpretation that is applicable to the written word. When written
philosophy is approached as a source of wisdom, the criticisms of Thamuz and Socrates
stand gravely weakened. In this section of this chapter, I argue that the disagreement
between Socrates and Plato over whether the written text can be treated as a source of
wisdom and thus attain value in the pursuit of philosophy becomes evident when one
considers the roles of space and time in Socrates’ critique of writing.
As mentioned above, Socrates’ critique of writing includes some points that are
absent from the criticisms voiced by Thamuz in the myth. The Socratic additions to the
case against writing cluster around a few key themes: genealogy and descent, protection
and defense, and vitality and immortality. This thematic cluster grows out of a germ from
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Thamuz’ critique, as the Egyptian god introduced the notion of fatherhood into the
discussion when he claimed that Theuth was unqualified to judge the help or harm of
writing as the father of letters (275a). Indeed, the development of these key themes seems
to be Socrates’ attempt to interpret Thamuz’ point about the fatherhood of logos just as
his critique of writing in general seems to be an attempt to interpret the myth.
The skeleton of the interrelationships between these themes newly introduced
with Socrates’ speech is roughly this: A writer or speaker is the father of his thought,
which may take the form of either a written or a spoken logos. A father has an interest in
the everlasting vitality of his progeny. The progeny will be vital for a longer duration the
more capable it is of self-defense. Oral logoi are capable of defending themselves, but
written logoi are not. Consequently, the father serves his own interest better by
expressing his logoi orally rather than in writing. In what follows, I spell out these steps
in greater detail and substantiate my claims that 1) the roles of time and space in Socrates’
critique of writing are intimately bound up with the way that the apparent source of a
logos influences its interpretation, and 2) Plato and Socrates disagree about the possibility
that philosophical literature may be approached as a source of wisdom and thus generate
interpretations that do justice to the wisdom of its content. The two claims coalesce under
a certain assumption to which I believe both Socrates and Plato adhered: that only logoi
that have stood the test of time can genuinely be approached as sources of wisdom.
In his own criticism of writing, Socrates extends Thamuz’ image of the writer as
the father of his text. He turns the image into a criterion for judging the effectiveness of
different modes of communication. If the goal of human reproduction is immortality
through the continuous creation of successive generations of offspring, then reproductive
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success is gauged by the viability of the offspring it engenders. Socrates applies a similar
standard to acts of communication: the written word is etched in water and is compared
to a quick-blooming, but quick-fading plant that leaves no permanent mark (276b-d). The
logos of oral discourse, on the other hand, when used in accordance with the dialectical
art by a teacher who can find a fitting soul for his message and who can sow speeches µετ’
ἐπιστήµης “with knowledge” (276e), will produce immortality by implanting the seeds of
similar speeches in other souls, which will in turn continue to reproduce themselves for
as long as the process is followed.
Thus, Socrates has constructed a way of judging philosophical writing based on
its communicative efficacy, and the specific criterion he uses is duration in time. A
philosophical communication that attains to immortality is perfect and ideal, and this is
only done through oral discourse, not through writing. But Socrates’ argument against the
communicative efficacy of writing points to an alternative criterion that Socrates ignores
— spatial extent. If a written work’s durability in time is a virtue to its father, then surely
its extent over a large spatial territory could be seen as a virtue as well. In each case, the
benefit seems to be the influence of the writing on a great number of individuals. Writing
that is durable over time influences a large number of generations despite influencing few
individuals per generation. Writing with great spatial extent may, like the plants of the
Adonis gardens, flourish and then perish quickly, but it nevertheless can reach a great
number of individuals even in its short span of life.
Yet Socrates does not see the time-influence and the space-influence of a logos as
redounding equally to the glory of its father. Instead, he demonstrates a clear privilege for
durability over extent. In fact, Socrates indicates that writing’s tendency to attain great
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territorial scope is one of its demerits. Spreading far and wide, a written work is “tossed
about everywhere” (κυλινδεῖται πανταχοῦ) equally among those who understand (τοῖς
ἐπαΐουσιν) and those unsuited to it (οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει). While the primary problem
raised here is that of a product of writing falling into the wrong hands, the phrase
κυλινδεῖται πανταχοῦ lays down haphazard spatial extent as the condition for this result.
Although this condition is tantamount to great space-influence, which another
thinker might view positively, Socrates speaks of it as a negative characteristic of writing
as a medium for philosophical communication. Two negative consequences of writing’s
affinity for great space-influence are named: firstly, it is indiscriminate, speaking
unselectively both to those who are knowledgeable and to those who have no business
with it (οῖς οὐδὲν προσήκει) (275e). Secondly, the written work cannot defend itself and
lacks its father as a defender (275e). Because of the first consequence a written work will
inevitably be mistreated. Because of the second consequence, there is no possible defense
against this mistreatment. Is Socrates here again falling prey to his own practical
ignorance of reading and writing?40
What is the danger in a written work reaching people who are not suited to it?
Socrates plays this rather close to the vest. The word προσήκει, which is used to denote
the class of readers who “have no business” with a given text (οῖς οὐδὲν προσήκει, 275e),
recalls previous discussion between Socrates and Phaedrus in which it was decided that
the true rhetorician would need to have both a knowledge of the truth of his subject as
well as a taxonomical knowledge of the types of human souls in order to accommodate
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Scholars have argued that Plato’s philosophical dialogues escape the charges of Socrates against written
philosophy. See especially Hyland 1968 and Zwicky 1997: 65. Relevant here as well is the notion
discussed near the end of this chapter’s Section III regarding the ability of the philosophical dialogue,
especially in the hands of Plato, to ward off dogmatic interpretation.
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his speeches to suit the latter (273d-e), and anticipates Socrates’ coming praise for the
one who τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώµενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν φυτεύῃ τε καὶ
σπείρῃ µετ’ ἐπιστήµης λόγους, “by using the dialectical art, having taken hold of a
suitable soul, plants and sows speeches with knowledge” (276e).
If one connects the foregoing discussion of rhetoric with this critique of the spaceinfluence of writing, therefore, Socrates seems to mean that writing which falls upon one
who has no business with it will be rhetorically useless. But this is only a missed
opportunity, and hardly the great harbinger of hermeneutic hell that Socrates makes the
territorial expansiveness of writing out to be. This, therefore, cannot be Socrates’
meaning unless failed rhetoric has strong negative consequences not mentioned in the
dialogue.
Another possible danger of writing falling into the wrong hands that Socrates may
have in mind is the second specific negative consequence of writing named by Thamuz
— that is, the deterioration of the teacher-student relationship. It has been noted above
that Socrates’ silence on this matter is more powerful than any statement he could make
about it, since the very conversation he is engaging in with Phaedrus demonstrates the
principle Thamuz explains at the end of the Egyptian myth. If this socio-pedagogical
consequence of writing is the one Socrates fears will result from the unchecked spatial
extension of writing, then the speech of Lysias is the dialogue’s example of a speech that
has extended too far in space. This is literally true, since one copy of Lysias’ speech has
already made it outside the walls of Athens (227a). But what is its danger? The only two
readers it has reached in this dialogue are Phaedrus and Socrates. The former is hardly a
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hostile reader of Lysias. Socrates, on the other hand, can fairly be described as a
somewhat hostile reader, prejudiced from the beginning against Lysias.
I therefore propose another way of understanding what Socrates fears about the
prospect of written works falling into the hands of those not suited to them that can
construe Phaedrus-reading-Lysias as an example of this phenomenon: Socrates
understands that a logos will only be approached as a source of wisdom if it is
approached with the hermeneutical prejudice reserved for what has stood the test of time.
Traditional myth carries with it a long history of usefulness and approval. The mere
existence of a myth in the present day is evidence that it has impressed each successive
generation since its origin as a logos containing something of value. In an oral culture —
which, for the most part, Greece had been until quite recently at the time of the Phaedrus’
dramatic date — if a myth is not deemed valuable even by a single generation, then it is
not preserved in the “cultural book,”41 but left to languish in the sands of time.
At play in the same question is the opposition between techne and sophia
established in the Phaedrus and whether the dialogue leaves open a possibility for their
cooperation and coexistence. Techne is the broader mode of human activity of which
writing is an example. This same mode of activity is accompanied by a mindset and an
attitude toward truth that Socrates finds worrisome. This attitude is exemplified by the
rationalist explanation of the story of the rape of Oreithuia and Phaedrus’ quick dismissal
of the myth of Theuth and Thamuz based on its source (229c-230a; 275b). The technical
attitude, the dialogue implies, is skeptical toward traditional truths. Socrates’ attitude
toward traditional myth presents a stark alternative to the technical, rational skepticism of
41
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selective pressures are severe.
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Phaedrus and the literate intelligentsia he represents. As has been previously noted,
Socrates displays a nuanced attitude toward myth in the Phaedrus. The dialogue includes
three myths, all spoken by Socrates. Along with two of these comes commentary on how
myth ought to be interpreted. I argue here that this commentary is meant to be considered
in relation to the interpretation of not only myth but text as well.
When the dialogue’s first myth is introduced, Socrates appears to care little for
intense reflection about myth. When pressed by Phaedrus to say whether he believes that
the myth of Boreas’ rape of Oreithuia is a true story (σὺ τοῦτο τὸ µυθολόγηµα πείθει
ἀληθὲς εἶναι; [229c]), Socrates replies that he does not have time (ἐµοὶ… οὐδαµῶς ἐστι
σχολή [229e]) for investigating the facticity of these things, and opts instead to trust in
the conventional opinion about them (πειθόµενος δὲ τῷ νοµιζοµένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν [230a]).
While this comment appears to disparage the value of myth and even more strongly to
disparage the activity of interpreting it, we must notice the myth’s historical facticity is
what Socrates dismisses as irrelevant to and inferior to knowledge of oneself. There is in
fact no indication that he considers the myth as a whole to be a distraction from the
pursuit of self-knowledge. Socrates may come to greater self-knowledge through
contemplating the myth itself from an immanent and questioning but non-critical position,
even if he cannot do so by debating whether the rape of Oreithuia ever actually occurred.
This distinction clarifies the sense in which Socrates views the authority of
traditional myth. The authority of myth is not one that demands belief in historical fact,
or even correctness on any particular point, but rather a guarantee that something worth
consideration lies within. How can this be guaranteed? By the fact of the myth’s tradition.
If, over the course of many generations, people in each have seen fit to devote time and
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energy to learning and communicating the myth, something worthwhile must lie inside it.
Myth commands our trust not simply because it is old, but because it has a long and
continuous record of approval. This fact is crucial to Socrates’ rejection of writing in
favor of oral discourse. The latter, Socrates sees, is capable of establishing authority and
commanding trust, since the process of dialectic and philosophical pedagogy by which it
is propagated can be seen as a stamp of approval repeated many times by many different
people.
One of the elements of Socrates’ criticism of writing that modern readers find
puzzling is his worry over the abuse or mistreatment of writing by its readers, and the
inability of the written text to defend itself.42 Various explanations of this point have been
offered, some more convincing than others. It has been supposed that Socrates fears that
esoteric texts, when misinterpreted, might inspire heinous acts on the part of their readers.
This is certainly a danger inherent to writing, and Socrates’ ultimate injunction to write
complex speeches for complex souls and simple speeches for simple ones lends it
credence. Nevertheless, if this is the danger that sits at the forefront of Socrates’ mind,
why should he not name it directly? When misreading a text inspires one to commit evil
actions, this is only an abuse against the text in a metaphorical sense; it can be damaging
to the reputation of the text, but in this case there is no direct assault by the reader against
the written work.
What then can Socrates have in mind when he laments writing as too vulnerable a
medium to protect itself against the insults of its antagonists? One way to approach the
question is to ask why someone would be motivated to assault a text in the first place.
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Luckily, the dialogue has provided, in the characters of Phaedrus and Socrates, two
images of the hostile interpreter. Phaedrus evinces his critical mindset first by appealing
to the rationalists who dismiss traditional myth as fiction and then by questioning the
validity of the myth of Theuth and Thamuz based on its obscure and dubious provenance.
Socrates, in contrast, is willing to defend traditional myth against the critical impulse of
Phaedrus, but himself is highly skeptical of Lysias’ written treatise on the rightful social
status of the non-lover.
Something can be learned from the skepticism of each, and it is important to
remember that Socrates’ behavior in the dialogues need not always be endorsed by Plato.
In the characters of Socrates and Phaedrus in the Phaedrus, Plato has provided paradigms
of two antithetical interpretive strategies: the technological snobbery of Phaedrus, who
scorns traditional myth,43 and the authoritarian traditionalism of Socrates, who accepts
the messages of traditional myth without argument and despises one particular written
speech (Lysias’) in addition to lambasting written speech in general.
Faced with these two opposing pictures of interpretive method, the reader of the
Phaedrus is led to ask what Platonic position might lie behind the confrontation he
depicts between the technological skepticism of Phaedrus and the authoritarian
traditionalism of Socrates. It is a commonplace in scholarship on Plato’s dialogues to
assume that the Platonic position is represented by Socrates, or whoever else the main
character of the dialogue happens to be. While this may be a hasty assumption in many
instances, it is particularly so in the Phaedrus, where Plato shows by the very act of
writing the dialogue that he is not in full accord with the Socratic cynicism about writing.
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“the youth corrupted by sophistry or even by excessive indulgence in dialectics.”
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The answer must somehow “save” writing from its Socratic (and Egyptian)
criticisms. I believe that Plato uses Socrates and Phaedrus to show two problematic
approaches to writing (and reading), each of which rests on assumptions Plato takes to be
untrue. Phaedrus is besotted with the newest technologies of his own advanced age. This
is demonstrated by his fondness for the newly widespread technology of writing and his
citation of the latest medical theories from the expert Acumenus (227a). For Phaedrus,
authority is derived from technical expertise. An affection for technology is one thing,
but Phaedrus takes the technological prowess of his age as proof of the superiority of the
intellectual products of his own time over those of previous generations. This is evident
in his challenging of the facticity of the myth of Oreithuia, in his initial contempt for
Socrates’ “Egyptian myth” about Theuth and Thamuz, and in the attitude he expresses
just following the myth of the cicadas, which upholds the importance of learning not
what is really just or good or beautiful (τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια µανθάνειν… οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως
ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ), but what seems so to whoever will make the judgment (ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντ’
ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν) (260a). The philotechnic Phaedrus appears to reify the art of
rhetoric and to mistakenly consider persuasion an end in itself rather than a tool meant to
serve what is just, good, and beautiful.
This same attitude, infatuated with skill and negligent of truth is writ large in
Socrates’ depiction of the rhetorical theorist Tisias (273a-274a). Tisias, according to
Socrates, argues that if a weak but brave man is taken to court for attacking a strong but
cowardly man, then it is in the interest of each to lie. The assailant should take recourse
in the unlikeliness of a smaller man attacking a larger one, and the victim should, instead
of admitting the shameful truth, lie that he was attacked not by the weak man individually
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but by him as part of a larger group. Gagarin (2006) compares this Platonic account of
Tisias’ arguments to a differing account at in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (2.24.11), in which
both parties lie in appeals to the likely (to eikos). In Aristotle’s account, the weak but
brave man claims that it is not likely for him to assault a strong man, while a strong man
who has been accused of attacking a weak one may claim that it is not likely for him to
have done so, since it would seem likely.44 Gagarin prefers Aristotle’s account for
including an original and surprising argument on which Tisias could stake his claim to
have invented rhetoric.45 But Plato’s account also contains a shocking argument — the
strong coward who has been attacked has the truth on his side, and yet neglects it in his
argument in an attempt to persuade. For Plato’s Socrates, this subordination of what is
true to what may be persuasive epitomizes the technical age of Lysias, Phaedrus, and
Tisias, which threatens to undermine philosophy through its use of written speeches to
pursue the persuasive without regard for the true.
Like Plato, Socrates sees the problem in this line of thinking exhibited by
Phaedrus. A traditional logos is not necessarily a useless one. Even if technological
advance and the skepticism that accompany it has brought to light the fiction of the
traditional myths, there is nonetheless the possibility that they may continue to instruct us.
Phaedrus overestimates the importance of the technological in the production of wisdom,
and this prevents him from accessing the wisdom contained in traditional myth. Socrates
approaches myth as a repository of old wisdom, where Phaedrus approaches it as an
inferior precursor to the leading scientific theories of his day. In Socrates’ noble character,
Plato pens a powerful point in favor of approaching myth as something to be interpreted

44
45

Gagarin 2006: 32.
Gagarin 2006: 32.

39

sympathetically and immanently. Socrates’ “charitable readings” of traditional myth have
made him a knowledgeable man, a talented speech-writer, and a skilled dialectician.
Phaedrus, on the other hand, holds many ill-considered opinions and displays a lack of
mindfulness that discourages the reader from emulating his attitude of technological
skepticism.
Despite Socrates’ noble and commendable prejudice in favor of traditional myth
as a source of wisdom, Plato nevertheless stops short of endorsing in full the Socratic
method of interpretation and the attitude toward the written text that he has Socrates enact
in the course of the dialogue. In fact, Plato appears to call the reader’s attention to two
unsatisfactory facets of Socrates’ literary mindset. The first is an error in the opposite
direction of Phaedrus’ technological snobbery: Socrates does not only exhibit a general
tendency to find myth a storehouse of wisdom, but in fact goes so far as to assume that
each myth is authoritative and that the opinions of mythic characters should be treated as
true. Just as Phaedrus trusts in the new theories of the Athenian techno-medical elite
without attempting to verify them through his own understanding, Socrates grants a
similar level of authority to traditional myth. This becomes clear in Socrates’ response to
Phaedrus’ objections following the statement of the “Egyptian myth.”
Phaedrus derides Socrates after the latter’s “Egyptian” story, commenting in an
attempt at humor how easily Socrates conjures a myth from anywhere he likes. The effect
of the comment is to undermine the myth on the grounds that it is obscure and springs
from a dubious source. The operative principle in Socrates’ rejoinder is that one ought
not to look toward whence a logos derives, but only to whether or not it is true. This
makes good sense. What does not is what Socrates fails to do afterwards. After
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establishing that he and Phaedrus ought to look to the truth of the myth rather than its
source, Socrates simply takes the truth of the myth for granted without providing any
argument on behalf of its content.46 While it is true that the following pages of the
dialogue offer some reasons for believing in the myth’s primary conclusions, it has been
argued here that these pages constitute a Socratic interpretation of the myth — one that
begins with the assumption that it contains wisdom and then proceeds to clarify and
expound its insights. If these speeches are interpretive, as they appear to be, then Socrates
never offers any argument for the inadequacy of writing or the validity of the conclusions
of the “Egyptian myth.” This shows a distortion of what Plato appears to point to as the
proper attitude toward traditional sources of wisdom — while it is reasonable to assume
their continued relevance and that their interpretation is a useful endeavor, the opinions of
the characters expressed must not always be taken as authoritative simply because of the
myth’s traditional status. One is tempted to extend the same line of thinking to the
Platonic dialogues themselves. The sensible approach for readers, Plato may have wished
to imply, is to view them as a source of wisdom without taking the words and deeds of
their characters, nor even of their lead characters, as above reproach.47
The second flaw in the Socratic attitude toward books, to which I believe Plato
calls the attention of the careful reader, is his refusal to consider that the durability of the
text might approximate the effect of oral transmission in establishing tradition and
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The brute force of Socrates’ naked assertion of the myth’s truth is captured nicely in a comment from
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developing positive prejudice in readers. The virtue of Socrates’ attitude toward myth is
that his prejudice leads to productive and insightful interpretations. This is contingent on
his willingness to look for what is wise in the myths. Plato shows that the same
possibility for productive prejudice can lie within books, but Socrates is not aware of this
possibility, perhaps due to his inexperience as a reader and writer, and the short-lived
status of the book in Greece at the time of his life.

V. Conclusion: The Book as a Storehouse of Wisdom
The position argued for in this Chapter identifies two areas where Plato seems to
distance himself from the words and deeds of Socrates. In the first case, Plato responds to
Socrates’ assumption that literature cannot be approached as a wise source for a logos
firstly by displaying through Socrates the very method of interpretation that, when
applied to literature, would make this untrue and secondly by calling attention to Socrates’
personal lack of empirical familiarity with literature, especially with its use by successive
generations. In the second case, Plato, despite championing Socrates’ traditionalist
method of interpretation over the technological snobbery latent in the method of Phaedrus,
nevertheless challenges Socrates’ hermeneutics on account of its risk — dogmatism. By
layering his dialogues with puzzles and inconsistencies which the “official teaching” of
the dialogue cannot resolve, Plato writes in such a way to encourage that aspect of
traditionalist interpretation which, because it expects to find wisdom, really does find it,
while simultaneously staving off the lapses into dogmatism that may follow an excessive
enthusiasm for time-tested literature.
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CHAPTER 2: Measurement and Reading in Plato’s Theaetetus
Writing has often been identified as a prominent theme in Plato’s Theaetetus. David
Halperin and Kathryn Morgan have suggested that the dialogue’s opening frame, in which a
character reads the main dialogue aloud from a book, emphasizes textuality in a way that is
“programmatic” for the rest of the dialogue.1 Harrison, Benardete, Tschemplik, and Howland
have analyzed this frame while giving due attention to its focus on writing.2 Especially relevant
for this my argument in this chapter is Andrew Ford’s observation that Plato uses the dialogue as
an opportunity to comment on the practice of interpreting a philosophical fragment.3
Indeed, the dialogue is tinged with textuality in its vocabulary and its imagery from the
opening frame to Socrates’ final speech. A brief overview of this phenomenon would point to the
book of the opening frame (143c), Socrates’ reference to Protagoras’ written work (152a, 171a,
171b),4 the image of the human mind as something quite like a wax writing tablet (191c), the use
of phonology and the Greek alphabet as a paradigm for the part-to-whole relation (163c, 202e),
and the mention of Meletus’ written indictment (τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν ἣν µε γέγραπται “the
indictment of Meletus which he wrote against me”) against Socrates with which the dialogue
concludes (210d). What is the meaning behind the Theaetetus’ preoccupation with writing, and
how is it to be understood by readers of the dialogue?
Many compelling interpretations of the Theaetetus have been proposed on the basis of the
dialogue’s manifest interest in writing, but these interpretations do not always venture far beyond
1

Halperin 1992: 99; Morgan 2003: 103
Harrison 1978; Benardete 1984: 85-87; Tschemplik 1993; Howland 1998: 39-51; Tschemplik 2008: 16-23.
3
Ford 1994.
4
While Socrates and his interlocutors do not engage in the full-scale interpretation of a robust work of literature in
the Theaetetus, the human-measure thesis is treated as a text in the dialogue. Theaetetus claims that he has “read”
the phrase “many times” (152a) and numerous allusions are made to the title of Protagoras’ book, Truth.
Additionally, among the important distinguishing marks of textual language from oral language are the specificity
and invariance of the former. Protagoras’ dictum is treated textually since it is directly quoted and, although
variously interpreted, never merely paraphrased.
2
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the short dramatic frame into one of Plato’s longest and densest dialogues, leaving much that the
Theaetetus has to say on the question of writing, reading, and their role in philosophy
unaddressed. It has been suggested that the dramatic and discursive levels of a Platonic dialogue
are complementary aspects meant to be read in concert, and that an interpretation of either the
drama or the philosophical content of a dialogue is incomplete or unverified until it can be shown
to be consonant, or at least consistent, with the message presented on the other level.5 If we
accept this principle of interpretation, a reading of the Theaetetus which fails to engage deeply
with the dialogue’s philosophical arguments will at best tell only half the story, but so will an
explication of the dialogue’s arguments that neglects writing, the most conspicuous literary
theme of the Theaetetus.
Because an exhaustive treatment of the dialogue’s many and diverse uses of the theme of
writing would exceed the scope of this chapter, I therefore intend to present an interpretation of a
single aspect of the role writing plays in the Theaetetus, and to ground this interpretation firmly
in the dialogue’s discursive content. As Andrew Ford has noted,6 the first half of the Theaetetus
depicts Socrates and the dialogue’s eponymous character in an act of textual interpretation. I
argue in this chapter that these textual investigations of the first half of the Theaetetus are
intimately linked in several ways with the arguments Socrates marshals against Protagoras on the
discursive level, especially the περιτροπή argument (170a-171d).
To state my thesis in brief, the first half of the Theaetetus presents Socrates’ attempt to
impress upon Theaetetus the value of philosophy and simultaneously to disparage the sophistic
life and mode of thought, which are represented by Protagoras and his doctrines. Socrates selects
the philosophical text as the site for the agon between Socratic philosophy and Protagorean

5
6

See Klein 1965: 17.
Ford 1994: 205-206.
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sophistry. In both word and deed, the philosopher demonstrates to the talented young
mathematician that writing is unable to preserve or communicate knowledge under the
relativistic assumptions of Protagorean thought. The use of the text in philosophical
communication can only be redeemed by a method of reading based on the philosophical (in the
sense of anti-Protagorean and anti-sophistical) assumption that ideas may share a common
measure between separate individuals.
The case Socrates builds on behalf of philosophy thus appeals to the literary inclinations
of Theaetetus, who admits to having read the Protagorean text πολλάκις (“many times” 152a).
Because the bright and bookish Theaetetus holds the text in high esteem, Socrates constructs an
argument for the value of philosophy that champions a philosophical style of reading as superior
to its sophistical alternatives. In this way, Socrates fulfills the injunction of the Phaedrus that an
effective argument be suited to the soul of its addressee (271b-272b). Therefore, Socrates’
accomplishments in the first half of the dialogue are twofold: he exposes the incompatibilities
between Protagorean thought and an optimistic view of the value of reading in intellectual
pursuits, and simultaneously sketches for Theaetetus a picture of philosophical reading to be
followed in the future.

Chapter Overview and Key Terms
Section I of this chapter is a philological review of the term µέτρον (“measure”) as it is
used in the Theaetetus to reveal the presuppositions of Protagorean relativism and Socratic
philosophy. The µέτρον figures heavily in the first half of the dialogue, and three distinct usages
of the term (or, in one case, Socrates’ use of a derivative, namely the denominative verb
παραµετρέω7) emerge in the early pages of the dialogue. Τhe µέτρον is first used as the pivotal
concept in Theaetetus’ geometrical proof about incommensurable magnitudes; I refer to this
7

Smyth 1920: §866.2.
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usage as the “mathematical use” of the word. Next, µέτρον acts as a key term in Protagoras’
statement that the human being is the “measure” of all things. Henceforth, I refer to this
statement as the “human-measure thesis,” and describe this as the “philosophical use” of the term
µέτρον. In the third usage of the word µέτρον, Socrates reformulates the human-measure thesis
into an idea that is more congenial to the practice of philosophical reading explored in the
dialogue; I argue that in Socrates’ usage of the word παραµετρέω, the philosophical text acts as a
measure of its human reader both by eliciting the beliefs of the reader and by measuring changes
in the reader’s beliefs over multiple readings of the same text. I describe the first two usages of
the word in Section I.1 below, and some important differences between the two are laid out in I.2.
Section I.3 describes the third usage of µέτρον.
Section I lays the foundation for Section II, as my analysis of the dialogue’s use of
µέτρον and its derivatives (Section I) prepares for my interpretation of the dramatic aims of
Socrates’ περιτροπή (“table-turning”) argument against Protagoras (Section II). The περιτροπή is
an argument directed at Protagoras by Socrates from Theaetetus 170a-171d. According to Gail
Fine, the argument’s nickname was first applied by Sextus Empiricus and seems to reference its
attempt to depict Protagoras’ position as one doomed to self-refutation.8 I argue that this
sequence in the dialogue is not meant as a formal refutation of Protagorean doctrine, but rather as
an ad hominem refutation of Protagoras himself, and that the περιτροπή is informed by the
paradoxes that measurement and incommensurability create for Protagoras as an advocate of
relativism.9 In fact, Socrates defeats Protagoras in the περιτροπή not by identifying a logical
8

Fine 1998: 201. Most scholars use the term περιτροπή to designate only pages 171a-171c. I use it to refer to the
entire section 170a-171d, both because the smaller section is so closely tied 170a-170e in its style of argument and
because I read the περιτροπή not only as the logical argument developed from 171a-171c, but as an ad hominem
argument that culminates with the departure of Protagoras at 171d.
9
The relativism of Protagoras is a philosophical position that Socrates glosses as “what seems so to each really is so
for him” (τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, 161c, with a similar gloss also given at 158e). This is the
meaning of “Protagorean relativism” as the phrase is used in this chapter.
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inconsistency in Protagoras’ beliefs, but by the “metaphilosophical”10 move of implicating him
in the performative paradox of a teacher who teaches that his teachings are no more true than
their contraries. Protagoras is forced into this ludicrous position because his human-measure
thesis entails the incommensurability of the perceptions and beliefs of any one human with those
of another.
Section II.1 explains the antiphilosophical qualities that provoke Socrates into his
refutation of Protagoras, while Section II.2 advances my metaphilosophical reading of the
argument. For my interpretation of the περιτροπή to stand, Socrates’ arguments in that sequence
of the dialogue cannot be a successful refutation of Protagorean relativism.11 Therefore, I offer
arguments against contemporary reconstructions of the argument that attempt to show its validity.
Section II concludes with a discussion of the role of writing and reading in the περιτροπή
(II.3). I propose that in this argument, Socrates’ use of the vocabulary of writing is meant to
show how the textual status of the teachings of the dead Protagoras compound his problem of
incommensurability. I argue that Protagoras’ teachings entail a hermeneutical relativism
(whatever a text seems to mean to each, it really does mean) under which his own exact authorial
διάνοια (“underlying thought”) can never be perceived or believed by anyone. But belief
determines truth under Protagorean relativism, so the problem of textuality actually renders
Protagoras’ beliefs false.
In Section III, I describe the spirit and practice of the strategy of philosophical reading
that guides Socrates and Theaetetus in interpreting the Truth of Protagoras. This strategy is
shown as an alternative to the hermeneutics implied by Protagorean relativism. In contrast to the

10

This term is taken from Griswold 1988. An explanation of its meaning and role in this chapter is given in Section
II.
11
Sedley 2005 and Giannopoulou 2011 are among the most recent scholars to advance this view. Fine 1998 holds it
conditionally. Further discussion of these views is included in Section II of this chapter.
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relativist hermeneutics of Protagoras, Socrates’ way of reading is consistent with philosophy
both in its dialectical character and its openness to the possibility of a common measure shared
by author and reader. Section III.1 lays out three specific techniques that belong to this Socratic
style of philosophical reading. Next, Section III.2 offers an original reading of a curious passage
in Socrates’ discussion of the art of midwifery (150c), and explains that “productivity” is a virtue
of a philosophical interpretation of a text. Finally, Section III.3 considers a few possible
objections to the style of philosophical reading that I have argued is displayed in the Theaetetus.

I. The µέτρον and Incommensurability
In I.1, after a brief look at the circumstances that lead to the introduction of Protagoras’
beliefs into the main conversation of the Theaetetus, I describe two uses of the term µέτρον in
the early pages of the dialogue. These uses are 1) the philosophical use, which arises from a
consideration of Protagoras’ human-measure thesis, and 2) the mathematical use, which plays a
key role in a mathematical demonstration described by Theaetetus that concerns
incommensurable magnitudes. Both uses of the term betray certain epistemological
presuppositions that bear on the problem of incommensurability, but these presuppositions are
quite different in each case. The µέτρον of mathematics is unable to relate all magnitudes to a
single, shared measure, which results in the mathematical problem of incommensurability. The
philosophical µέτρον solves this problem for each individual, but in so doing transfers the
problem of incommensurability to the realm of interpersonal communication, including written
communication. The difference in how these two concepts of µέτρον handle the problem of
incommensurability is discussed in Section I.2.
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I.1 Two uses of “µέτρον”: The Philosophical and the Mathematical
In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates leads the talented young mathematician Theaetetus and
his teacher Theodorus on a quest for the true definition of knowledge (ἐπιστήµη).12
Approximately the first half of the dialogue is devoted to an examination of Theaetetus’ first
proposed definition of this term: ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήµη ἢ αἴσθησις, “as
it seems to me now at any rate, knowledge is nothing other than perception” (Tht. 151e).13
As soon as Theaetetus offers this definition, Socrates quickly explains that Theaetetus’
answer to the age-old question of knowledge is not entirely original. In fact, Socrates claims,
Theaetetus’ definition simply rewords an opinion popularized by the sophist Protagoras in his
book Truth:14
Κινδυνεύεις µέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήµης, ἀλλ’ ὃν ἔλεγε
Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δε τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. Φησὶ γάρ που “πάντων
χρηµάτων µέτρον” ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, “τῶν µὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ µὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ
ἔστιν.”
In fact you have probably stated an account of knowledge that is not trivial, but rather the
one which Protagoras also said, although he said these same things in another manner.
For he says somewhere that “The measure of all things” is man, “of those which are that
they are, and of those which are not that they are not.”
(Tht. 152a)
Charles Kahn (1973) includes in his syntactic study of the verb εἶναι an account of the same
Protagorean formula quoted by Socrates. Kahn classifies both the participles (ὄντων and µὴ
ὄντων) as “veridical” uses of εἶναι. He means that their purpose is neither to assert the bare
existence of something (this is the “existential” use in Kahn’s terminology) nor to link a subject
to a predicate (the “copula” use), but to assert that something really is so. Following this
12

Socrates meets Theaetetus and his teacher Theodorus at a gymnasium in Athens in the Spring of 399 BCΕ. During
their discussion, Socrates conjures Protagoras to join in as the fourth interlocutor. See Nails 2002: 320-321 for
additional details of prosopography and dramatic setting.
13
All citations of Plato’s Theaetetus are taken from the 1995 OCT edition of Duke, Hicken, Nicoll, Robinson, and
Strachan. Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
14
The Truth is now lost to us, and although little is known about its contents, the book probably began by stating the
human-measure thesis. For discussion, see Lee 2005: 12.
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designation, Kahn translates Protagoras’ sentence: “Man measures what is so, (determining) that
it is so.”15
Thus, the basic sense of this Protagorean doctrine is this: each ἄνθρωπος acts as an
ontological and veridical measuring stick,16 determining what is true by his or her perceptions
and beliefs.17 Socrates quickly turns to an example to fill out the meaning of the human-measure
thesis, and the significance of the claim that each man is a µέτρον (152b-152c). Sometimes a
wind blows, making one person cold, but not another. Protagoras would propose of this situation,
according to Socrates, that the wind is cold to the one who feels that it is, but not cold to the one
who does not feel that it is cold. So what a person perceives is true for that person (152c). Every
human, as the measuring stick of what is true determines what really is cold (or not) simply by
perceiving that it is (or not). It follows that perception is infallible, and error impossible (152c).
Scholars disagree on key issues regarding the meaning of the human-measure thesis,
some of which will be discussed in this chapter. I table these controversial details for the time
being, however, and focus instead on Protagoras’ usage of µέτρον to denote a veridical
measuring stick of the sort described above. This use of the term will be referred to as the
“philosophical” use in order to distinguish it from other uses of the word that occur in the
Theaetetus.
Among these other uses of µέτρον is what I term the “mathematical use.” The notion of
the µέτρον makes its debut in the dialogue through its role in a mathematical problem concerning
incommensurability that helps Theaetetus better understand the sort of answer Socrates has in
mind when he asks for a definition of knowledge. Theaetetus learns quickly that his first attempt
15

Kahn 1973: 367.
LSJ 1996 s.v. µέτρον 1. measure, rule.
17
The exact scope of the claim is a matter of some controversy, which the second section of this chapter will discuss.
The human-measure thesis is at least broad enough to cover all perceptions. Socrates gives Protagoras trouble later
in the dialogue (170a-171d) when he extends it to cover the truth of beliefs as well. See Lee 2005: 45 for discussion.
16
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to define the term was unacceptable to Socrates because it named the various types of knowledge,
such as that of the shoemaker and the baker, without identifying the common characteristics that
unite them under the term “knowledge” (146c-147c).18 Although this first attempt at a definition
fails, Theaetetus has recently thought up a mathematical demonstration that models perfectly the
sort of definition Socrates is seeking.
Instead of just a list of the instances of knowledge, Theaetetus realizes, Socrates expects a
definition after the same fashion as the definitions that Theaetetus himself has just devised for
the solution of a geometrical problem that he had been working on before Socrates’ arrival
(147c-148e). A full understanding of the meaning of the mathematical use of µέτρον requires an
explanation of this geometrical problem. The problem concerns the incommensurability of
certain geometrical lines.19 There is no common measure, for instance, between the side of a
square with an area of three units and a line whose length is one unit. Theodorus, who instructs
Theaetetus in geometry and related arts at the gymnasium, has been performing special,
individualized demonstrations for many such lines (the side of a three-foot square, the side of a
five-foot square, all the way up to the side of a seventeen-foot square) that each is
incommensurable with the foot-long line.
Theodorus works these problems out one-by-one because he lacks a general proof
inclusive of all lines that are incommensurable with the foot-long line. This proof is impossible
unless a classification of number has been made that distinguishes between the lines that are
commensurable with the foot-long line and those that are not.20 This is the crucial step that
18

Scholars have generally treated this as a preliminary attempt to the actual first definition proposed by Theaetetus,
which comes a few pages later.
19
Commensurability and incommensurability are defined in Book X, Definition I of Euclid’s Elements: σύµµετρα
µεγέθη λέγεται τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ µέτρῳ µετρούµενα, ἀσύµµετρα δέ, ὧν µηδὲν ἐνδέχεται κοινὸν µέτρον γενέσθαι (“Those
magnitudes are said to be commensurable which are measured by the same measure, and those incommensurable
which cannot have any common measure.” Translated by Heath 1926; emphasis in original).
20
Sachs 2004: 23, fn. 5.
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Theaetetus provides. At 147e, Theaetetus recounts for Socrates how he divided all number into
two classes—he designates “square numbers” (τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον) as those that
come into being by an equal times an equal and “oblong numbers” (προµήκη ἀριθµὸν) as those
that can only be produced by a greater times a lesser or a lesser times a greater. Theaetetus then
calls the side of a square with an area equal to a square number a “length” (µῆκος) and the side
of a square with the area of an oblong number a “surd” (δύναµις). Lengths are commensurable
with the foot-long line while surds are not, and a single proof can demonstrate this for all cases.
This proof is contained in Euclid’s Elements, Book X, Proposition 9, and it is generally believed
that Theaetetus discovered it.21 At the heart of this geometrical problem lies the problem of
incommensurability, and the strange and somewhat disconcerting fact that the ratios between
certain lines are fundamentally indeterminable. For these geometrical lines, the relationship to a
µέτρον represents their ability to be known. Commensurable lines, those that share a µέτρον, can
be put into an exact ratio with one another. In contrast, the ratio between incommensurable lines
can only be approximated, and can never be expressed with complete accuracy. The
mathematical µέτρον is therefore a valuable epistemic tool for the mathematician, but one whose
applicability is naturally and necessarily limited to certain magnitudes to the exclusion of others.
In conclusion, both the philosophical and mathematical use of the word µέτρον play a
large role in the Theaetetus and have important epistemological implications. The philosophical
concept of the µέτρον glorifies human perception (or thought) as an ontological and veridical
measuring stick, while the mathematical µέτρον allows the exact quantitative relations of
phenomena to be known, but only in certain cases. Beyond these similarities, however, a number
of important differences persist between these two uses of the term. These differences are
discussed in the following section.
21
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52

I.2 Two differences between the mathematical and philosophical µέτρα
The philosophical µέτρον of Protagoras’ human-measure thesis encompasses a somewhat
different range of functions from the µέτρον of the mathematicians. It retains the mathematical
function of serving as a common element that can be used as the basis of comparison between
two things (although in philosophy they are appearances,22 while in mathematics they are
magnitudes). But the µέτρον of the human-measure thesis takes on the additional role of an
ontological and veridical standard. Under the human-measure thesis, the µέτρον is not only the
grounds for relational reasoning between two entities, but also the touchstone and guarantor of
being and truth for an individual appearance or proposition. Something may be said to be or to be
true if it is “measured” so by a human acting as its µέτρον.
In contrast to the philosophical µέτρον, the µέτρον of mathematics is ontologically and
veridically neutral; it does not share in the confirmatory function of the philosophical µέτρον by
acting as a touchstone or guarantor of being or truth.23 In mathematics, when two magnitudes are
recognized as incommensurable, the compatibility of one of the two with a given µέτρον (the
unit length) does not imply a higher ontological or veridical status for the measurable magnitude
in comparison to its incommensurable counterpart.24 One of the magnitudes is more easily

22

I have chosen this term since it seems to straddle the (often unnecessary) division between sensory perceptions
and proposition beliefs. A perception and a belief can both be said to “appear to” someone. This is in fact a pivotal
ambiguity of the περιτροπή argument (discussed below), which begins with the following summary of the humanmeasure thesis: “doesn’t he say that what appears to each also is for the one to whom it appears?” (τὸ δοκοῦν
ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ; 170a). In the conversation that precedes this moment in the dialogue,
these “appearances” have been exemplified by sensory perceptions. The περιτροπή extends the scope of the
“appearances” to include opinions.
23
Heath 1926: 1 quotes from the first scholion of Book X of Euclid’s Elements: “[The Pythagoreans] (showed that)
all magnitudes can be rational [ῥητά] and all irrational [ἄλογα] in a relative sense [ὡς πρός τι].”
24
David 2001: 18 also sees this neutrality of the mathematical µέτρον at work in Theaetetus’ proof about
incommensurables, and he makes the bold and intriguing suggestion that this same neutrality regarding two sets,
when one is traditionally privileged over the other, is the paradigm for Plato’s solution of the problem of non-being
in the Sophist (257b), which involves reconceiving non-being as simply other than being rather than its opposite. But
at least for a human reasoner, the two situations are quite different. There is little temptation to privilege one set of
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measured and used in calculation, but the two are equally real.25 Thus, the function of the µέτρον
as a veridical measuring stick is proper to the philosophical use of the term, but is excluded by
the mathematical use, while the µέτρον’s function as a grounds for comparison between separate
entities is common to both the philosophical and the mathematical uses.
A second difference between the mathematical and philosophical uses of µέτρον is that
the philosophical use erases or ignores the limitation that µέτρον faces in the world of
mathematics. As Theaetetus’ proof about incommensurable magnitudes illustrates, the µέτρον is
a valuable epistemic tool, but it faces the necessary limitation of being unable to place certain
incommensurable magnitudes in exact ratio. In contrast, when an individual ἄνθρωπος —
Theodorus, for instance — is taken as the µέτρον of the things that are and are not, the problem
of incommensurability vanishes. Conformity to the singular µέτρον of Theodorus is necessary
for existence and veridicality. Anything that cannot be measured by Theodorus-as-metron is
thrown out from the beginning as an object of thought or inquiry. As a result, anything that can
be thought or perceived by Theodorus is commensurable with all the rest, and the problem of
incommensurability is never encountered.
But while the human-measure thesis appears to eliminate the problem of
incommensurability, it has the actual effect of increasing it substantially. Although the humanmeasure thesis does force all appearances into a state of mutual commensurability through their
relation to a common µέτρον, this commensurability only holds for the internal thoughts and
perceptions of a single ἄνθρωπος.26 Since each ἄνθρωπος differs from all the rest, each acts
mutually commensurable lengths over another set, because the selection of the unit will determine which set will
have members that can be measured, and the selection of the unit is in most cases arbitrary or conventional. There is
a clear human interest, however, in privileging being over non-being.
25
This ontological equality likely stems from the knowledge that commensurability is always to an arbitrarily
chosen unit. It is a contingent property that is subject to change whenever a new unit is selected.
26
Woodruff 1999: 302 mentions the possibility that the human-measure thesis refers to the species rather than the
individual. But Plato demonstrates his awareness of the species interpretation of the human-measure thesis, and
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differently as a µέτρον (166d). Consequently, the thoughts and perceptions of different
individuals do not share a common measure. For me, then, all my own appearances are
commensurable; each appearance, opinion, or perception will be intelligible in terms of all the
others.27 But this commensurability ends as soon as another ἄνθρωπος is acknowledged by the
first. The thoughts and perceptions of the one do not share a common measure with those of the
other, and there is no common ground for a discussion that includes the opinions or perceptions
of both perceivers. Τhis lack of a µέτρον for measuring common perception between different
people is precisely the Protagorean problem that Socrates will exploit in his ad hominem
argument against Protagoras (170a-171d), discussed in Section II of this chapter.
This problem of incommensurability which plagues Protagorean relativism is not
tantamount to its incomprehensibility or logical failure. On strictly logical grounds, the humanmeasure thesis remains a viable philosophical position even considering this unfortunate
consequence of interpersonal incommensurability. However, the position does seem extremely
unattractive when viewed in this light, and, furthermore, it implicates Protagoras in a
performative paradox. As Socrates shows in the περιτροπή argument, the human-measure thesis
may very well be true for Protagoras, but it is merely a personal truth, and one that calls into
question Protagoras’ attempts to teach it to others.

represents it as a watered-down version of Protagoras’ precise position: καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ µὴ παντάπασι τὸν
Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι, “and those who assert the logos of Protagoras not quite
entirely consider wisdom to be something like this” (172b).
27
Τhis is so, at any rate, when the human-measure thesis is considered on its own terms. The “secret doctrine” of
flux, a metaphysics to which the human-measure thesis is later tied, implies that since the self is in constant flux and
does not endure as a single thing through time, there is no commensurability of appearances even for a single
individual. If a mathematical measure constantly changes in length, the magnitudes for which it can act as a measure
will not be commensurable with one another.
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I.3 Measurement in Perception and the Dialectic of Philosophical Reading
According to the Protagorean human-measure thesis, each human measures his or her
perceptions: a human is the measure of all things, of those which are that they are, and of those
which are not that they are not. Whatever seems true to each person really is true for him or her.
Each perception, then, is an act of measuring by which the perceiver measures whatever he or
she sees, hears, thinks, etc. against his or her own internal µέτρον. However, this picture is
complicated by a curious choice of words that Socrates makes twice in a short passage (154b). I
argue here that this passage indicates that perceptions — particularly the perceptions of texts28 —
are not only measured by but also are measures of their human perceivers. This passage purports
to explain the mechanical details of the theory of perception to which the human-measure thesis
is tied:
Οὐκοῦν εἰ µὲν ᾧ παραµετρούµεθα ἢ οὗ ἐφαπτόµεθα µέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερµὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἄν
ποτε ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτὸ γε µηδὲν µεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ
παραµετρούµενον ἢ ἐφαπτόµενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἤ
τι παθόντος αὐτὸ µηδὲν παθὸν ἂλλο ἂν ἐγένετο.
Then if that which we measure ourselves against, or which we touch, were large or white
or hot, it would never become anything different when it ran into someone else, at least if
it doesn’t undergo any change; and if, in turn, the thing doing the measuring or the thing
doing the touching were each of those things (i.e., large, white, or hot), then it in its turn
would not become different when something else approached it or was affected by it, if it
weren’t itself affected.
(Tht. 154b)
If a human is the measure of all things, then he or she appears to be the one who actively
measures (the grammatical subject of παραµετρέω [“to measure”]29 and therefore the measurer),
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Ford 1994: 216 points out that the interpretation of Protagoras’ text is itself an example of perception from which
knowledge may or may not result.
29
LSJ 1996 s.v. παραµετρέω lists two broad meaning groups (I and II) for the verb with the first divided into three
senses (1, 2, and 3). Sense 1 of meaning group I is the sense used in the passage quoted above, “measure one thing
by another,” or “compare.” Sense 2 “measure by a standard,” or “supply a standard of measurement for” differs little
from the first. Sense 3 “adjust expenditure,” “measure out,” “cause to be measured out,” and especially “supply
according to specific measurements” appears to differ from the previous two in referring to an action in which
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and his or her perceptions would appear to be the objects of this measurement. Contrary to this
common-sense interpretation of the human-measure thesis, that the human-as-measure is the
measurer of all things, παραµετρούµεθα in this passage appears in the middle voice rather than
the active. The middle participle παραµετρούµενον then appears with an active sense, restoring
the human measurer (or the human’s sensory faculty) to a purely active role. The implication is
that the human observer not only measures an external object in the act of perception, but also
measures himself or herself by means of the object being perceived.
Both uses of the verb in the passage quoted above are uses of the middle voice form of
the verb, both of which mean “compare oneself with another thing,” with the complement of the
comparison appearing in the dative case. Thus, the complement, ᾧ παραµετρούµεθα of 154b can
be taken to mean either “that by which we measure ourselves” or “that to which we compare
ourselves,” and it refers to the object of perception, which, in the act of reading, is a text.
Similarly, τὸ παραµετρούµενον could be acceptably rendered by the LSJ 1996’s “that which
makes the comparison” or “the thing doing the measuring.” In either case, τὸ παραµετρούµενον
refers to the human perceiver, or to the sensory faculty of that human. In the case of reading, this
human is a reader and the faculty in question is whatever combination of sight and intellection is
involved in the act of reading.
The middle voice form of παραµετρέω in the passage above, which makes a perceiving
human not only the measurer, but also the thing measured, points to a way of interpreting the
human-measure thesis which stands far from what Protagoras surely meant, yet lends the
statement much more use and credibility for Socrates in his project of educating Theaetetus in
the ways of philosophical reading. Socrates’ novel use of the verb and the new meaning that it

measurement is a means to an end rather than the end itself. The second meaning group means to “measure a
distance past,” or “pass by” and requires an accusativus loci.
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twists out of the human-measure thesis carry important implications for the dialogue’s reflections
on the relationship of reader to a text. To wit, Socrates’ use of the verb implies that the text acts
as a measure of its human reader both by forcing the reader to confront beliefs which may not
have been previously articulated and by tracking the changes in belief of a reader over the course
of multiple readings.
But in order to understand the Socratic purpose behind this usage of the verb meaning “to
measure (oneself),” it is necessary to situate this passage in the context of its surrounding
arguments. Theaetetus responds to the speech of Socrates quoted above (155b-c) with one of the
dialogue’s many instances of a simple, but not insignificant question: “What sort of things do
you mean, Socrates?”30 Socrates’ answer to the question of what he means directs the dialogue
toward the issue of relational change, the discussion of which will shed light on the relationship
between text and reader. Socrates assures Theaetetus that he will soon learn the meaning of
Socrates’ enigmatic speech from a “small example” (σµικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγµα, 154c). The
example is a problem of language: If six dice are compared to four, they are more, but when they
are compared to twelve, they are fewer. How can the six dice change from more to fewer without
undergoing any change or decrease? The same problem is restated using Socrates himself as the
subject of a second example.31 Socrates has stopped growing, but Theaetetus has not. In the
course of a year, Socrates may go from being taller than Theaetetus to being shorter (than him),
without having undergone any change in his own height. In the end, Socrates is what he was not
30

This question and variants of it appear in these passages at least: 146d, 152d, 164d, 188d, 189c, and 191b. In a
dialogue that has much to say about interpretation, the dramatic scene intermittently reminds the reader of the gulf
between ῥήµατα (“words”) and διάνοiα (“meaning”) and the ubiquitous possibility of misinterpretation. Such an
inquisitive interlocutor as Theaetetus recalls one of the demerits assigned to writing in the Phaedrus, that a text
cannot answer questions. But as Hyland 1968: 41 notes, the dialogue form does allow for some questions to be
raised and addressed. Perhaps in no other Platonic dialogue than the Theaetetus is this function of his literary form
more evident.
31
Roochnik 2002: 44-46 gives a fuller treatment of Socrates’ habit in the dialogue of using himself and Theaetetus
as examples of the philosophical ideas being discussed. The effect is to “continually place the phenomenon of selfrecognition before our eyes, and [demand] that we wonder about it” (46).
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before (namely, shorter), but he has not become that way. There was no internal process of
change in Socrates that produced this result (155c).
After laying out the first of these examples but before detailing the second, Socrates leads
Theaetetus in establishing a few principles that seem true to the two of them despite the problems
of relational change they have mentioned: (1.) Nothing could ever become greater or less, either
in bulk or in number, as long as it is equal to itself. (2.) Whatever is neither added to nor
subtracted from itself? could never increase or decrease, but would always be equal to itself. (3.)
It is impossible for that which was not before to be afterward without having come to be and
becoming (154e-155b).
These three principles are introduced as common-sense beliefs that deserve to be
articulated independent of and prior to an analysis of the problems of relational change that are
being examined. They are primary and, to the interlocutors at least, uncontroversial, and a
proposition will be plausible only insofar as it harmonizes with these principles. Yet the three
agreed-upon notions seem “to fight among themselves in the soul” when the problems of
relational change are being discussed (ταῦτα δὴ, οἴοµαι, ὁµολογήµατα τρία µάχεται αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς
ἐν τῇ ἡµετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωµεν; 155b). The crux of these problems
is that the relational nature of qualities such as “more” and “taller” is being misconstrued.
Without additional context, the sentence “Socrates becomes shorter” means that Socrates at a
later point in time is shorter than Socrates at an earlier point in time, and that in between these
two points a process of decrease in height took place.
However, in the context of Socrates’ second example of relational change, the meaning
of “Socrates becomes shorter” is that Socrates at an earlier point in time was taller than
Theaetetus, but at a later point in time was shorter than Theaetetus. Without the context that
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Theaetetus is the µέτρον by which Socrates’ height is being measured, the µέτρον is assumed to
be Socrates’ own height. Within the specific context of his example, however, Theaetetus acts as
the µέτρον against which Socrates is measured. So, when Socrates passes from the condition of
being taller than Theaetetus to the condition of being shorter than him, even though Socrates
himself does not decrease in height, the reason is that a relative change in height has been
effected between Socrates and his µέτρον (Theaetetus) by virtue of a change in the height of the
latter.
In short, these problems of thought exemplified by the dice, or by Socrates who is taller
and then shorter without changing in height, illustrate the idea of relational change—namely,
that something may appear to be different when the circumstances around it change, even if that
thing does not undergo a process of change itself.
It is difficult to consider this idea of relational change in the Theaetetus without being
reminded of the dialogue’s habit of showing how the meanings of words change for the speakers
and hearers along with the progress of the discussion. The words retain their original form
throughout, but as arguments developed to help explain and justify these words are upheld or
defeated, the significance and esteem of the words themselves are subject to abrupt vacillation.
The clearest example of this pattern is found at 162c-d, where Theaetetus sums up how the
development of the conversation has cast an entirely new light on the human-measure thesis:
ἡνίκα γὰρ διῇµεν ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ
µοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον τάχα µεταπέπτωκεν.
For while we were going through how they say that what seems so to each this also is for
the one to whom it seems so, it appeared to me to be entirely well said: but now quickly
the opposite has fallen out.
(Tht. 162c-d)
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This sudden change in the reception of the argument was in fact prefigured even when
Theaetetus expressed his approval of it:32
Ἀλλ' ἔµοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, θαυµασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ
ὑποληπτέον ᾗπερ διελήλυθας.
Well for me, whenever I hear you go through it like this, it seems to possess reason
wonderfully, and it needs to be understood in the very same way you have gone through
it.
(Tht. 157d)
The language of Theaetetus’ approval, although made eager and emphatic by the verbal adjective
showing obligation (ὑποληπτέον: “it needs to be understood”), is in fact quite cautious and even
suggestive of (the possibility of) a pending reversal. It is modified by a restrictive temporal
clause (“whenever I hear you go through it like this [but perhaps only at these times]”) and uses
the subjective and impermanent language of “seeming.” Theaetetus is thoroughly, but not
lastingly, convinced of what he has heard, and this difference shows in the language he uses to
express his agreement.
In this comment from Theaetetus, the human-measure thesis, or more precisely, the
statement that “whatever seems so for each is so for him” (τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ ἔστιν,
161c), which is understood between Socrates and Theaetetus to be the logical equivalent of the
human-measure thesis, is revealed as a µέτρον itself insofar as it has measured the philosophical
development of Theaetetus. The opinions of Theaetetus change as the dialogue progresses, and
the human-measure thesis, while repeating the same thing always as Socrates was very aware
that words must inevitably do, measures the progress of the discussion and the changing views of
Theaetetus (cf. Phaedrus 275d).33 Just as the six dice change from more to less while staying the
same in number, the human-measure thesis has changed from plausible to implausible while
32

Note that this passage corresponds to 162c, where Theaetetus recants his approval with the νῦν δὲ conjunction.
At this point in the Phaedrus, Socrates says that a text ἕν τι σηµαίνει µόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί, “always signifies only the
same one thing.”
33
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always repeating the same words. The doctrine’s shift in favor is due to the shifting significance
of its words, from what seems at first a promising prospective solution to the problem of
knowledge, to a questionable thesis in light of recently advanced arguments.
This is the dialectic of philosophical reading, wherein a text is first measured by a human
interpreter, who then, in a reversal of roles, becomes swept up in a process of self-interpretation
(ᾧ παραµετρούµεθα, Tht. 154b) as the reader returns to the text to learn from it another time.
This pattern is especially applicable to a reader of Theaetetus’ ilk, who will read the same text
many times (152a). Like the dice that are more and then less without becoming so, a text at one
time says things that strike us as true, but at another time no longer seems to speak to us without
undergoing any change in itself. The change has instead occurred in the reader. More will be said
later in the chapter about the character of philosophical reading, but a description of the various
uses of the concept of µέτρον in the Theaetetus would be incomplete without mention of the
dialectic of philosophical reading, in which human and text alternate as µέτρον.
The dialectic of philosophical reading in which a reader uses the text as a measure of
himself or herself is evident in this passage dealing with relational change in another way as well.
Socrates and Theaetetus, in attempting to interpret the text of Protagoras, have articulated and
affirmed three principles of reasoning in which they have full confidence. But these principles
were not passively read from the text; instead, Socrates and Theaetetus were stimulated by their
reading of the text to recognize these principles. The text introduced problems that forced its
readers to articulate their confusion and the reasons for it. Thus, the Protagorean text helps
clarify the beliefs held by Socrates and Theaetetus and in doing so demonstrates the power of a
text to act as the measure of its human reader, bringing his or her beliefs to light.
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In Section I, I have tried to show that the Theaetetus is concerned on many levels with the
issue of incommensurability. The dialogue also explicitly thematizes both a philosophical and a
mathematical usage of the term µέτρον, and the tension between these two uses of the term
brings out problematic aspects of the relationship between Protagorean thought and
incommensurability. I have also identified a peculiar use of a verb related to µέτρον
(παραµετρέω), and suggested that Socrates manipulates the voice of the verb by changing from
active to passive. In so doing, he is able to twist out of the human-measure thesis a dialectical
picture more suitable to the practice of philosophical reading: the image of the text—or the
understanding of a text—as a µέτρον by which changes in one’s self can be observed. The idea
that a careful reading of a text leads to a twofold interpretation, of both text and reader, is
confirmed by other aspects of the dialogue that are discussed in III.2 of this chapter. Next, I
continue to look into Plato’s extended discussion of the µέτρον, appealing to this term and the
related concept of incommensurability as the foundation of one of Socrates’ most intriguing
arguments against Protagoras, the περιτροπή, or “table-turning” argument.

II. A Metaphilosophical Reading of the περιτροπή
Having proposed in Section I that the Theaetetus exposes incommensurability as a
problem in the thought of Protagoras, I now turn to the area of the dialogue in which Socrates
explicitly exploits the vulnerability that results from this problem of incommensurability on the
dialogue’s discursive level. In II.1 and II.2, I argue that Socrates’ περιτροπή is not intended as a
conclusive refutation of Protagoras’ human-measure thesis, but as an ad hominem argument
intended to show that Protagoras himself is made to look ridiculous as a consequence of his own
views. The argument calls attention to the fact that if there is no common measure shared
between individual humans, then Protagoras’ ideas are at best true for him alone, and his
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teaching them is a futile endeavor. In Section II.3, I further argue that Plato, through the use of
the vocabulary of writing in this section of the dialogue, provides the outline of a complementary
argument to the περιτροπή that explores the problems that incommensurability and textuality
pose for Protagoras as a dead writer whose views live on only through his writings and other
people’s interpretations of them.
My proposal that the περιτροπή should be seen as targeting Protagoras rather than his
beliefs solves another potential problem of the dialogue: a reader of the Theaetetus unfamiliar
with Plato’s style might find Socrates’ arguments against Protagoras too numerous to be
convincing.34 Is the Socratic position overdetermined, betraying its own weakness by launching
so many different assaults on Protagoras’ beliefs, when any one of them, if successful, would be
sufficient to refute those beliefs?35 On the contrary, Socrates’ argument against Protagoras is not
overdetermined, because the preliminary objections (all those coming before 170a) are all
propaedeutic to the περιτροπή (170a-171d) and the subsequent argument from expertise (177b179b), and only the latter of these directly targets the relativist beliefs of Protagoras.
This section of the chapter focuses on the περιτροπή or “table-turning” argument,
deployed by Socrates from 170a-d. I argue that many scholars have missed the point of this
passage, reading it either as a successful or failed attempt to logically refute Protagorean
relativism. I propose instead that the περιτροπή is the climax of a “metaphilosophical”36
encounter between Socrates and (the imagined) Protagoras, staged by Socrates for the benefit of

34

Chappell 2004 enumerates twelve objections to Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge, which is taken as the
logical equivalent of Protagoras’ human-measure thesis.
35
Hyland 2004: 85-92 makes an excellent case for the possibility that Plato’s dialogues were simply not intended to
be conclusive philosophical arguments, but rather “invitations to philosophy.” This may seem to contradict my
position (articulated in the previous chapter) that the argument from expertise (177b-179b) constitutes a successful
refutation of Protagorean relativism, but even Hyland’s position allows for Plato to have planted the seeds for a
successful philosophical argument. These arguments are only successful in potential, and must be cultivated by
readers of the dialogues to reach their full blossom.
36
This term is taken from Griswold 1988, and it is discussed in the following paragraph.
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Theaetetus’ philosophical education. Accordingly, I claim that the argument is not Plato’s
attempt to expose logical shortcomings in Protagoras’ beliefs, but rather his depiction of Socrates
fighting tooth and nail to impress the value of philosophy on a talented young mind.
In his essay “Plato’s Metaphilosophy: Why Plato Wrote Dialogues,” Charles Griswold
argues that many of the conversations found in Plato’s dialogues are not philosophical, but prephilosophical.37 Philosophy is a level of human discourse, and although it is defined in part by its
subject matter, certain fundamental axioms must be agreed upon for philosophical thought or
discourse to take place. But many of the characters in Plato’s dialogues reject these basic axioms,
the foundations of philosophical thought. When Socrates runs up against a Callicles (Grg. 481c
ff.) or a Thrasymachus (Rep. 336a-357a, 498c-d), for instance, his effort is not expended on
“object-level philosophy,” that is, the consideration of philosophical questions in a philosophical
manner, but on a defense of philosophy itself and of philosophical discourse.38 Because Socrates’
interlocutors often reject the foundations of philosophical inquiry, Socrates cannot use the
philosophers’ toolkit in these confrontations without begging the question. Instead, he must meet
his opponents-in-argument on a pre-philosophical level.39 On this level of discourse, it is action
and deed that rule the day.40 Since λόγος is what is on trial in a metaphilosophical tilt, rational
discussion must be held in abeyance.
The intent and effect of the περιτροπή argument is to demonstrate in deed as much as in
argument how Protagoras’ relativism limits the validity of his ideas to his own world—which
like everyone else’s private world is incommensurable with all the rest—and works directly
37

Griswold 1988.
In fact, Griswold 1988: 156-157 implies that Socrates goes looking for this type of interlocutor: “Socrates cannot
‘justify’ or ‘demonstrate’ his own activity except by coming across or finding someone who is not already persuaded
by its possibility and worth” (emphasis in original).
39
Griswold 1988: 149.
40
The paradigmatic example of Griswold 1988: 158-160 is Socrates’ demonstration with the slave boy in the Meno.
Socrates does not merely explain to Meno that recollection is possible, but shows him in deed that his paradox about
learning cannot be airtight.
38
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against his purposes as an educator of and influence upon talented youths like Theaetetus. As I
argued in Section I.2 above, Protagoras’ philosophical concept of µέτρον, which takes each
human as an ontological and veridical measuring stick, eliminates the problem of
incommensurable appearances for a single individual. But it does so by making each human a
unique µέτρον, such that no appearances are shared as common ground between different
subjects. Socrates capitalizes on this weakness of the Protagorean position in the περιτροπή by
drawing out the absurd and unseemly consequence that Protagoras cannot rationally argue on its
behalf, since it is merely a personal belief with no claim to intersubjective truth. In this way,
Socrates forces Protagoras to cede the project of Theaetetus’ intellectual and moral education to
Socrates after a quick and final retreat (171d).
The Theaetetus is a dialogue on knowledge, but the question of knowledge leads quickly
to a discussion of the philosophy of Protagoras, and it is on this issue that the conversation
dwells for much of the dialogue. The Theaetetus, then, features a debate between Socrates and
Protagoras that flits about between a philosophical and a pre-philosophical grounding. The broad
outline of the argument is this: Socrates and Protagoras engage mostly on pre-philosophical
terms before the performative refutation of Protagoras by Socrates occurs at 171d. From that
point on, having won the day for philosophy and having justified its axioms through Protagoras’
abandonment of his position, Socrates continues to critique Protagorean relativism, but now with
a wider leash to use the tools of philosophy and dialectic.
As a result, the Theaetetus contains a two-pronged approach to anti-relativist
argumentation. The first argument occurs largely in the dialogue’s dramatic register, and
culminates in the decisive deed of Protagoras’ abandonment of the argument and his own
position, which results from the isolating and disgraceful conclusion that his theory can be true
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only for him (171d). The second argument occurs largely on the discursive level, making liberal
use of philosophical presuppositions that the radical relativist would deny. This two-pronged
approach against anti-philosophical thought was also recognized by Aristotle in the Metaphysics
(Γ.5, 1009a16-22). Here, Aristotle states that there are two lines of argumentation that may be
used to support the principle of non-contradiction, one for the genuine thinker who has lost his
way and become confused (this would describe Theaetetus in his eponymous dialogue) and
another for the eristic arguer (Protagoras, presumably).41 The Theaetetus shows dramatically
why the two modes of argument are necessary, and vividly illustrates the type of character to
whom each mode responds.

II.1 The Anti-Philosophical Nature of Protagorean Relativism
If Plato’s dialogues are “invitations to philosophize,”42 whose primary purpose is to
depict Socratic attempts to justify philosophy before his often anti-philosophical interlocutors,
how are we meant to read the drama of the Theaetetus?43 This understanding of the purpose of
the dialogues is advocated by Drew Hyland (2004). Hyland argues on the grounds of literary
41

The Protagoras of the Theaetetus does not deny the principle of non-contradiction, although the question did
surround the historical Protagoras (cf. Woodruff 1999: 302). The question of what distinguishes philosophy from
sophistry or other anti-philosophical intellectual practices is a difficult issue discussed by Griswold 1988, Nehamas
1990, and McCoy 2009. I do not attempt to answer it here, but it is clear that Protagoras’ beliefs, by entailing
interpersonal incommensurability, are anti-philosophical in undermining the value of philosophical dialogue, which
must be central to Plato’s conception of philosophy, whatever it may be exactly.
42
Hyland 2004: 91. This idea, along with ideas about Plato’s “metaphilosophical purposes” developed by Griswold
1988, is central to my interpretation of the περιτροπή in this section. That argument is not Plato’s critique of
Protagoras’ human-measure thesis, but Socrates’ refutation of Protagoras the man.
43
Klein 1965: 27-31 presents an interpretation of the Theaetetus that sees philosophical import in dramatic
developments, and is largely consistent with and perhaps even supportive of the program in Griswold 1988 of
metaphilosophical interpretation. Klein argues that Protagoras is refuted in deed by Socrates’ successful luring of
Theodorus into a philosophical discussion, since it was Protagoras (through Socrates) who cautioned that if Socrates
were unfair in argument, he would chase people away from philosophy. Klein’s reading identifies an important
dramatic elenchus of Protagoras in the Theaetetus, but I think the significance is even greater than Klein realizes.
The Theaetetus ends with Socrates’ departing to face an indictment that will ultimately lead to his execution (210d).
In the absence of Socrates, Theodorus will continue as Theaetetus’ mentor. If Theaetetus is to have a future in
philosophy, Socrates must leave his mentor better disposed to a life for which he displays a strong antipathy (164e).
The reading of the dialogue’s drama in Blondell 2002 is sensitive to Socrates’ desire to reproduce himself in
Theaetetus.
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form that the main purpose of the dialogues is not to express Plato’s philosophical positions, but
to show portraits of Socratic philosophy. One pose Socrates often strikes in these portraits is the
metaphilosophical advocate of philosophy. Socrates speaks in the Theaetetus with the
mathematicians Theaetetus and Theodorus, and he discourses at length with the deceased
Protagoras by impersonating the sophist himself. Is there a metaphilosophical clash between
Socrates and the mathematicians, or between Socrates and Protagoras, or both?
To answer this question, we must find a presence in the dialogue that threatens
philosophy as it is conceived by Plato’s Socrates. The evidence that this anti-philosophical
presence cannot be mathematics is twofold. To begin with, the first sentence spoken by Socrates
in the dialogue (Εἰ µὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ µᾶλλον ἐκηδόµην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ
ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων, εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωµετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νεῶν
ἐπιµέλειαν ποιούµενοι, “If I cared more about the people of Cyrene, Theodorus, I would question
you about the situation and the people there, whether any of the young men there are doing work
concerning geometry or some other philosophy” [Tht. 143d]) considers geometry as a type of
philosophy, and one that Socrates esteems greatly at that. Additionally, the use of mathematics as
an idealized model for philosophical knowledge indicates that there is no inherent opposition
between philosophy and the science of geometry practiced by Theaetetus and Theodorus (148d).
Therefore, mathematics and philosophy are not enemies in this dialogue, but the situation
in the Theaetetus is more complicated than this. Indeed, the two mathematicians have different
relationships to their art, to knowledge, and to philosophy. Theaetetus is young, bright,
impressionable, and highly responsive to Socrates. Theodorus, on the other hand, is reluctant to
philosophize, an older man who is set in his ways and loathe to renounce his old choice to turn
away from “bare words” (ψιλοὶ λόγοι, 165a). Thus, the metaphilosophical drama of the
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Theaetetus is built around Socrates’ attempts to educate Theaetetus, who is already sympathetic
to his philosophical manner of thinking, but it is also built around Socrates’ attempts to increase
Theodorus’ sympathy for philosophy.44 Perhaps Socrates knows that Theaetetus will only be able
to flourish in philosophy if his mentor, Theodorus, is not opposed to this practice.45 On the whole,
then, philosophy is not opposed to geometry, but Theodorus has some anti-philosophical
inclinations that must be mollified in order for Theaetetus to develop his philosophical potential
in the absence of Socrates, who faces trial and eventual execution.46
The twin opponents of Socrates on the metaphilosophical level, then, are Theodorus, who
expresses disdain for philosophy (165a) and Protagoras, whom Socrates detects as an intellectual
influence on Theaetetus (152a) and whose ideas preclude certain basic assumptions of
philosophy as it is conceived by Plato, especially the notion that philosophical dialogue is
powerless to lead discussants toward intersubjective truths. An examination of Protagoras’
beliefs, especially as they are expressed in the Theaetetus, help to clarify what is at stake in the
metaphilosophical confrontation between Socrates and Protagoras and why Plato found
Protagoras’ teachings to be a threat to his view of philosophy. In keeping with this study’s focus
on writing, we must also ask what the specific implications of Protagoras’ beliefs and doctrines
are for the interpretation of texts, and how Protagoras’ hermeneutics might pose a threat to
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Socrates praises Theaetetus’ solution to the problem of powers, and encourages him to apply the same manner of
thinking to the question of knowledge (148d).
45
Howland 1998: 70-71 fittingly refers to Theodorus and Protagoras as “trustees of the soul” of Theaetetus. Αn
early exchange between Socrates and Theodorus reveals that Theaetetus’ financial trustees have squandered away
his inheritance (144d).
46
Νῦν µὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον µοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, ἥν µε γέγραπται, “Now then, I
need to appear at the King’s Stoa regarding the indictment of Meletus, which he has written against me” (210d).
Harrison 1978: 119 connects this use of γέγραπται to the appearance of the same word in the dialogue’s narrative
frame 143a, where it is used by Eucleides to describe his composition of the book from which the main action of the
Theaetetus is read aloud. Harrison accordingly argues that the Theaetetus emphasizes writing to highlight the aporia
and failure of the dialogue’s conclusion and to indicate that the dialogue itself may be an indictment of Socrates.
This conclusion seems hasty to me, but Harrison nevertheless raises a worthwhile question in the link between the
themes that bookend the Theaetetus: writing and the execution of Socrates.
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philosophical literature. This latter question is taken up in Sections II.3 of this chapter and
expounded upon in Section III.
Socrates’ comment at 162a demonstrates the threat that relativism poses to philosophy. In
concluding a lengthy criticism of the human-measure thesis, Socrates propounds the following
rhetorical question:
τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς
ἑκάστου οὔσας, οὐ µακρὰ µὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ Ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου
ἀλλὰ µὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο;
For to inspect and to take it in hand to refute the appearances and opinions of each other,
if those of each are correct, is that not a large and shrill form of nonsense if the Truth of
Protagoras is a true thing which he declared from the inner sanctum of his book, rather
than a joking one?
(Tht. 162a)
The effect of Protagoras’ doctrines is to discourage (by implicitly declaring these things futile)
communication in general debate about opinions and principles of thought and belief
specifically.47 And yet this discouragement is wholly at odds with philosophy as Socrates
appears to conceive it, for two reasons. The first anti-philosophic quality of Protagorean
relativism is that Socratic philosophy is based in conversation, and the motivation behind
conversing with someone is the belief that something can be learned, taught, or better understood.
But perhaps more important in the context of the Theaetetus, in which Socrates has
explicitly encouraged Theaetetus to use philosophical problems as a starting point for articulating
his own most basic beliefs, is that whenever what seems to be the case really is so, there is no
impetus even for an individual to reflect on his or her basic presuppositions about the world,
such as those articulated by Socrates and Theaetetus in response to the dice example (154c-d; see
section I.3 above). If we follow Protagoras, we renounce our practice of articulating principles of
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Lee 2005: 25-26 posits that Antilogiai (“Opposing Arguments”) may have been an alternate title of Protagoras’
Truth. This title would indicate a blatantly sophistic bent in the writings and teachings of Protagoras.
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belief and interpretation, and we wind up believing whatever “seems” true prima facie no matter
how outrageous it may be. But the outrageousness of our beliefs is just one costly result among
others, since failing to look for deeply held beliefs causes self-knowledge to suffer.
Finally, the point of greatest humiliation for Protagoras in this refutation is that he is a
sophist who professes to teach the Truth to young men. But his authority as a teacher is
undermined by his own doctrines, which imply that his students are no less wise than he.48
Moreover, at the end of the περιτροπή he is caught in a performative contradiction. It is revealed
that Protagoras’ truth is his alone and cannot be taught or defended in the face of a contrary
opinion. But he has been attempting to persuade present company of the value of his views with
rational argument for much of the dialogue. This explains why Protagoras’ final action in the
dialogue is to “run off” (ἀποτρέχων, 171d) after what seems a very half-hearted rejoinder (171d).

II.2 The περιτροπή
At 170a, Socrates initiates an argument against Protagoras. In my view, this argument is
not intended to disprove the human-measure thesis, but to force the man who holds it, Protagoras,
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Woodruff 1999: 308 counters that a Protagorean response would be to separate knowledge from teaching,
directing the latter toward advantage instead of truth. This would not, however, help Protagoras save face in the case
of the human-measure thesis, which is an abstract doctrine of no obvious practical value. An old anecdote variously
assigned either to Protagoras and a pupil named Eualthus or to Corax and Tisias, the putative pioneers of the
rhetorical art, demonstrates that the sophists’ attempts at practical education was beset by a paradox of its own.
Gagarin 2007: 33 summarizes the events thus: “The story is that when Tisias went to study with Corax, he promised
to pay the fee if he won his first case. Then when Tisias had learned his lessons, Corax asked for his fee but Tisias
refused. They went to court and Corax argued that he should receive the fee whether he won or lost the case: if he
won because he had won, and if he lost, then according to the terms of the agreement (because Tisias would have
won his first case). In response, Tisias ‘used the same argument, altering nothing.’ Whether he won or lost, he
argued, he should not have to pay: if he won because he had won, and if he lost, then according to the terms of the
agreement (because he would have lost his first case).”
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into a position of impotence and social irrelevance.49 Indeed, it is no coincidence that this
argument has been labeled ad hominem at least twice.50
The περιτροπή is thus a metaphilosophical argument that causes Protagoras, an opponent
to philosophy, to abdicate the discussion so that a philosophical refutation of his views may
commence. Cornford does not explain why he sees the argument as ad hominem. Lee’s reasoning,
which I find persuasive, is that the περιτροπή forces Protagoras to revise the universal scope of
his original claim, and that the argument is thus not a decisive refutation. However, Lee’s
analysis pays little attention to the dramatic context of the Theaetetus. I argue that the ad
hominem aspect of the argument functions not just to force Protagoras to revise his previous
formulations of his doctrines, but also to undermine him so thoroughly that he loses all weight as
an intellectual and moral authority in the struggle to win Theaetetus and Theodorus over to his
way of life and thought.51
In the following discussion of the περιτροπή, I first summarize the argument as it appears
in the text.52 I then review cases for and against two important and related questions surrounding
modern scholarship on this passage—first whether Protagoras is better characterized as an
“infallibilist”53 or a “relativist about truth,” and, second, whether Socrates’ argument defeats the
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I, therefore, disagree with the comment in Chappell 2004: 112 that the argument “does not prove what it is meant
to prove” but does succeed in making a different point “equally worth making.” This interpretation still hinges on
the inveterate assumption that all of Socrates’ speeches are intended to be rigorous philosophical arguments.
Sensitivity to dramatic elements in the dialogues and to the “metaphilosophical level” explored by Griswold 1988
cast serious suspicion on this assumption.
50
Cornford 1935: 80; Lee 2005: 56.
51
On the περιτροπή argument in general, see Chappell 2006.
52
Useful reconstructions of the argument appear in Sedley 2004: 57-62, Lee 2005: 51-54, and especially Fine 1998:
210, 217, 224-225. I find Sedley’s version disagreeable for reasons that are discussed below. Fine and Lee are both
clear and accurate, with Fine’s being the more exhaustive. Syllogistic reconstructions of this sort often excise
important material from the Platonic passage they attempt to distill. But when the validity of an argument needs to
be assessed, they are often more suitable than paraphrases of the sort I supply.
53
The term “infallibilist” (or “infallibilism”) comes from Fine 1998, and was coined to denote the position of
someone who believes that all beliefs are true simpliciter. This is in contrast to a position referred to as “relativism
about truth,” which holds that all beliefs are true for the people who hold them. Lee 2005: 30-34 offers a thorough
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human-measure thesis. In support of my reading of the argument as metaphilosophical in nature
and as a powerful display of the undesirability of Protagoras’ position on intersubjective
incommensurability, I argue that Protagoras is committed neither to infallibilism nor to
relativism about truth, and that, on strictly logical grounds, the περιτροπή is not a conclusive
refutation of the human-measure thesis.
The argument runs thus (170a-170b): all people esteem knowledge-based expertise,
contrary to Protagoras’ denial of expertise and false opinion. They demonstrate this belief in
their actions; on the battlefield, for example, soldiers follow the lead of their general because of
his training and knowledge. Those who believe in knowledge-based expertise also believe in its
opposite, false opinion. So all people believe that humans sometimes have true belief based in
knowledge and expertise, but at other times have false opinion.54 Given the prevalence of the
belief that people sometimes have false opinions (a claim I will refer to in brief as “PSHFO”), it
follows that some people must have false opinions. Because if PSHFO is true, then some people
have false opinions by virtue of the content of PSHFO. But if PSHFO is false, then PSHFO must
nonetheless still be true, because those who believe in PSHFO itself do so falsely. In either case,
some people must have false opinions, which contradicts the Protagorean dictum that whatever
seems so is so for the person to whom it seems, the corollary of which is that there is no false
opinion.
Socrates next proceeds to direct this same line of argument against the human-measure
thesis itself (170c-171c). If all other humans believe that the human-measure thesis is false,
Socrates claims, then Protagoras himself is compelled to agree, since he acknowledges that their

and descriptive explanation of how these two positions differ. The term is synonymous with one meaning of
subjectivism, but has the disadvantage of carrying other meanings as well; see Giannopoulou 2011: 76; Lee 2005: 31.
54
As Lee 2005: 33-34 notes, “Our ancient sources are unanimous in representing Protagoras as rejecting the
possibility of error.”
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beliefs are true. By conceding the contrary of his own thesis, Protagoras is committed to the
belief that his own belief is false. Thus, no one besides Protagoras believes in the humanmeasure thesis, and, in fact, Protagoras himself cannot really hold the belief either, since its very
thesis forces him to acknowledge the truth of all beliefs. Since, therefore, no one believes the
Truth of Protagoras, it is true for no one.
This last conclusion is surrounded by controversy. Much of the disagreement among
scholars stems from Socrates’ omission of the relativizing qualifiers (phrases such as for him,
etc.) that are sometimes appended to beliefs expressed in the Protagorean epistemological
framework, but are omitted at a crucial step in the argument (171b). It does not appear that
Socrates’ argument succeeds, because Protagoras could easily counter that he is only forced to
concede that the contrary of his thesis is true for those who believe it, and that his own humanmeasure thesis, and not its contrary, is what continues to be true for him.55 In omitting the
qualifiers that delimit for whom the human-measure thesis is or is not true, Socrates appears to
have blundered badly and to have built a fallacious argument that Protagoras could easily
sidestep by insisting that the truth of the human-measure thesis is relative to each individual. In
this case, the truth of Protagoras’ thesis for Protagoras would be secure, regardless of the beliefs
of others.
However, this objection assumes that Protagoras is a “relativist about truth,” despite at
least some evidence to the contrary. The περιτροπή, therefore, opens up questions about the
precise nature of Protagorean relativism, and these answers are often indexed to certain answers
to the question of the success of the περιτροπή as a refutation of the human-measure thesis.56
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Bostock 1988: 90 concisely pins the success of the entire argument on the matter: “This conclusion only seems to
follow if we carelessly omit the qualifications ‘true for so-and-so.’”
56
Woodruff 1999: 302-304 lists four solutions to the issues of Protagorean relativism regarding truth, each with
roots in ancient sources. The first is the Aristotelian tack, which represents Protagoras as a denier of the principle of
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Most recent commentators on the passage would agree that if Protagoras is a relativist about
truth, then Socrates’ argument fails as a refutation of the human-measure thesis, but if he is an
infallibilist, the argument succeeds.57 The reason for this is that if Protagoras is willing to
relativize truth, then Socrates’ omission of relativizing qualifiers at 171b from phrases like τὴν
αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, “he would agree that his own (belief) is false” renders his argument
fallacious, because Protagoras would only go so far as to agree that his belief is false for those
who think it is false. On the other hand, if Protagoras means to espouse that all beliefs are true
simpliciter, then he lacks recourse to the defensive maneuver of relativizing the truth of the belief
that the human-measure thesis is false to those who think so. The truth of their belief is true
simpliciter, and Protagoras is then driven by Socrates to self-refutation.
Many commentators on this passage simply assume that relativism about truth is a saving
move available to Protagoras in the face of Socrates’ arguments, and that the arguments fail since
Protagoras would be sure to accept the gambit of relativizing truth. In the eyes of these readers,
the argument fails as a refutation of the human-measure thesis.58 Gail Fine (1998) argues the

non-contradiction. But Lee 2005: 64-72 argues convincingly that this passage from the Metaphysics was not meant
as a representation of Protagoras’ actual position, but as a response of which he could avail himself in the face of
Plato’s περιτροπή. This position has no modern exponents, and if Lee is correct, Aristotle was incorrectly thought to
subscribe to it. The second Protagorean path laid out by Woodruff 1999: 303 is the one taken by Sedley 2004, which
“denies that one speaker can really contradict another.” If this position is correct, then the περιτροπή can be
construed as a valid refutation of the human-measure thesis. Under this reading of Protagoras, truths are relative to
private worlds, and no one can have full access to the beliefs of another. Second-order opinions are thus impossible,
and it would be nonsensical to suggest that Protagoras could ever agree that the human-measure thesis is true for
others. Problems with this position as it is advanced by Sedley will be discussed below. The third reading of
Protagoras’ position vis-à-vis truth is represented by Fine 1998, who believes that Protagoras is an infallibilist and
that his human-measure thesis is successfully refuted by the περιτροπή, since infallibilism is ill-equipped to explain
conflicting second-order beliefs (i.e. beliefs about beliefs), although it can successfully accommodate conflict in
perceptual appearances. The fourth possibility, and the one that Woodruff seems to favor of the historical Protagoras,
is that “there is one truth for all of us, but that it is complex enough to support our different views of it” (Woodruff
1999: 303). However, Woodruff submits that the Protagoras of the Theaetetus must be committed to either the
second or third of the four possibilities (304). Woodruff’s scheme does not leave room for Lee’s reading, which
states that Protagoras’ position on truth is prior to the consideration of second-order beliefs.
57
This is the explicit position of Fine 1998: 234 and Lee 2005: 57. Others would likely agree, but strongly prefer
either relativism about truth or a logical equivalent of infallibilism to the exclusion of considering the implications
of the περιτροπή for the alternative.
58
See, for instance, Vlastos 1956: xiv; McDowell 1971: 171; Bostock 1988: 89-90; Chappell 2004: 113.
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opposite position, that Protagoras is consistently portrayed by Plato as an infallibilist, and that
the περιτροπή is therefore a successful refutation of his position.59 David Sedley (2004) also
argues for the success of the argument against the Protagorean position, by utilizing an axiom he
terms the “single relativization hypothesis.”60 Mi-Kyoung Lee (2005) holds a unique position:
she thinks Protagoras subscribes to a position that could be called “relativism of fact” and that is
prior to the alternatives of infallibilism and relativism about truth.61 I believe that Lee’s
characterization of Protagoras’ relativism is truest to the Theaetetus and makes the best sense of
the περιτροπή; only if we ascribe to Protagoras a position like relativism of fact is Socrates’
argument redeemed as neither a conclusive refutation (as it is for those who attribute infallibilism)
nor a facile sophistry (as it is for those who attribute relativism about truth).
For my metaphilosophical reading of the περιτροπή to hold up, two things must be true of
it. (1.) It must fall short as a rigorous refutation of the human-measure thesis, and (2.) it must
expose an unsavory aspect of Protagorean thought which is inconsistent with philosophy as
conceived by Plato. Regarding (1.), I will show the shortcomings of Sedley’s interpretation of
the argument by which the περιτροπή successfully refutes the human-measure thesis.62 My
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Fine 1996 adduces strong evidence in favor of infallibilism. Most notably, if Protagoras is an infallibilist, then he
requires the metaphysics of flux introduced by the Secret Doctrine to avoid violating the principle of noncontradiction. Under a traditional object-property metaphysics, contrary perceptions such as a wind that is cold for
Socrates but hot for Theaetetus quickly devolve into contradiction (assuming that the wind felt by each is the same).
But if the wind that is perceived is different for each perceiver, changing from one thing to another as a function of
the fact-sets unique to each, then contradiction can be avoided. If, however, Protagoras is a relativist about truth,
then he has no need for this metaphysics, since contradictory perceptions can simply be relativized to perceivers
without alteration to the common sense notion of the perceptible object. Yet Plato ties Protagoras to the metaphysics
of flux to strengthen and explain his position, indicating infallibilism. Chappell 2004 and Lee 2005 both argue
against Fine’s reading in some respects.
60
Sedley 2004: 57-62. Sedley 2004: 57 acknowledges Burnyeat 1976 as the inspiration behind his own reading:
“My main innovation is to try to show how the text itself can deliver the key insight…which Burnyeat has already
supplied.”
61
Lee 2005: 45.
62
Fine 1998 also argues for the validity of the argument on the condition that Protagoras is taken to be an
infallibilist. Fine is right in this claim, but she also believes that Protagoras is portrayed by Plato as an infallibilist.
Lee’s 2005 reading that Protagoras is neither an infallibilist nor a relativist about truth because he has not been made
to confront the problem of second-order beliefs depicts a more subtle and probably more accurate position for
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answer to (2.) has already received much discussion in this chapter. The point of the περιτροπή is
to highlight the problems of interpersonal incommensurability that follow from Protagorean
relativism.
David Sedley’s interpretation of the περιτροπή, which makes the argument come out
valid, hangs on two key moves. The first is to establish the “single-relativization assumption,”
and the second is to read the dative τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ instead of the vocative ὦ Πρωταγόρα at
170c.63 The single-relativization assumption states: “No truth is, or could be, hierarchically
relativized to two or more subjects. That is, there are no truths of the form ‘For X, such-and-such
is the case for Y.’”64 Sedley’s Protagoras believes that since the world of each individual is
private to him, Y’s world is “outside of X’s experience, and therefore not a subject of truth for
X.”65
On Sedley’s reading, the function of the dative at 170c (τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ) is to relativize
the argument to Protagoras. Socrates is not stating what is true generally, but what is true in the
private world of the sophist. In other words, a premise such as “many people believe there are
false beliefs” then has the force of “For Protagoras, there are many who believe there to be false
beliefs.”66 In Sedley’s view, then, there is therefore no recourse for Protagoras to relativize the
truth claims reached in this argument a second time, for they are already relative to him and
further relativization would violate the single-relativization assumption. Socrates’ argument

Protagoras. I therefore agree with Fine’s understanding of how the argument functions, but contest the notion that it
is meant as a conclusive refutation of the human-measure thesis.
63
Sedley 2004: 57-58. There is manuscript support for both readings, but Sedley acknowledges that his reading is
“contrary to all the modern editions” (58).
64
Sedley 2004: 58. Emphasis in the original.
65
Sedley 2004: 59.
66
Sedley 2004: 57, 59.
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appears to be strengthened by this reading, since any contradictions reached are now fatal to the
argument, with the “defensive move”67 of relativizing them away having been taken off the table.
But is Sedley correct to assume single relativization? In fact, his assumption simply
reverses the move made by the majority of commentators, who assume that relativization is the
obvious Protagorean response to the περιτροπή.68 In fact, both groups might overlook the point
of the argument, which is simply to raise the thorny issue of double-relativization—an issue that
Protagoras has not had to encounter previously in the dialogue.69 Single-relativization cannot be
assumed just as Protagoras’ willingness to relativize truth cannot be assumed. Either position
would only be declared in response to the περιτροπή, but Plato represents Protagoras as choosing
to run off rather than commit to either position (171d).
More to the point, Sedley’s reading of the dative τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ at 170c and his
conclusion that its purpose is to relativize the argument to Protagoras leads to a problem for his
understanding of private worlds. If Protagoras’ world is private to him and outside the
experience of others, Socrates could not construct a syllogism that is true for Protagoras, since
Socrates has no experience of the sophist’s private world. Sedley is not consistent on
intersubjectivity, since he allows for the construction of a syllogism by one person that is true for
another (as Sedley believes Socrates does for Protagoras) but he does not allow Protagoras to
relativize the truth of the human-measure thesis to each individual.
So far in Section II, I have attempted to show that Socrates’ περιτροπή argument is ad
hominem and metaphilosophical rather than a formal refutation of his views, and that its success
67

Sedley 2004: 59.
See my discussion earlier in this section.
69
The issue only arises at the level of second-order beliefs. Contradiction can always be avoided in the case of
conflicting perceptions by relativizing each perception to different fact-sets, but if Y believes that X’s belief is false,
the conflict cannot be resolved in the same manner. See Ambuel 2015: 80-81; Lee 2005: 51. Thus, the observation
of Sedley 2004: 58 that the single-relativization assumption is “never stated but seems to be unfailingly observed” is
not due to Protagoras’ awareness of and aversion to double-relativization, but rather to the fact that he has not been
made to confront the problem at all until this section of the dialogue.
68

78

depends on the problem of incommensurability that a relativist like Protagoras faces, namely, the
erasure of a common measure of appearances (including thoughts) capable of bridging the gap
between unique humans-as-measures. To support this reading, I have argued against
interpretations of the argument that take it to be a successful philosophical refutation of
Protagoras’ human-measure thesis. In what follows, I return to the topic of writing, first
identifying its subtle role in the argument discussed above (II.3), and then attempting to
articulate the spirit and strategies of a Socratic art of philosophical reading from which
Protagoras would benefit, but which his human-measure thesis precludes (III).

II.3 How is writing related to the περιτροπή?
Continuing one of the dialogue’s predominant themes, the question of writing, the
περιτροπή points out a troublesome aspect of Protagoras’ human-measure doctrine and the
metaphysics of flux that subtends it. According to the metaphysics of the Secret Doctrine, which
has been connected to the thought of Protagoras (152c-152e),70 all appearances are instantaneous
representations of things so fleeting that they must be said to “become” rather than to “be.”
Combining this metaphysics with the human-measure doctrine, one arrives at the conclusion that
perceptions are of fleeting objects-in-an-instant, no two of them alike for any two subjects, and
that all these perceptions are equally valid. The elaboration of Protagoras’ doctrines and of
associated doctrines such as the theory of flux has recently expanded this theory to include not
only perceptions, but also judgments. Among other things, this theory puts γράµµατα in a very
vulnerable ontological position, more vulnerable even than the one assigned to literature at the
end of the Phaedrus.
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On Protagoras’ “secret teaching,” see Tht. 152c10 (τοῖς δὲ µαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν), and see
the discussions by Lee 2000 and Sørensen 2016.
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Plato brings this text-weakening metaphysics home to roost in the περιτροπή with
repeated puns on the title of Protagoras’ Truth and by referring at key points to the written form
of Protagoras’ thought and the difficulties that presents for him uniquely. There is a double
meaning behind Socrates’ conclusion that “The Truth of Protagoras would be true for no one”
(οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου Ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, 171c). If the objects are subject to a flux so
pervasive that no two people ever perceive the same one, how can a text have the same meaning
for any two people, including its author? The περιτροπή argument turns on the Protagorean
notion that only something believed may be true. Plato adds to the surface-level argument of this
section of the dialogue a subtle complementary argument; with Protagoras dead and his thought
preserved only in writing (the living memory of his followers, such as Theodorus, is shown to be
inadequate by his weak command and half-hearted defense of Protagoras’ teachings), there is no
one left to believe in the Truth as Protagoras conceived it. Even if a sympathetic reader happens
upon Protagoras’ book, the metaphysics of flux requires that this reader will have a different
interpretation of Protagoras’ writings and a different understanding of the human-measure thesis
than Protagoras himself did. So, ever since the time of Protagoras’ death it has been true that the
Truth of Protagoras could be true for no one other than Protagoras himself.
This point is emphasized not only by Socrates’ puns on the title of the book, but also at
171a when Socrates chooses the verb ἔγραψεν for the phrase “what he wrote” over equally
plausible alternatives such as “what he said” (ἔλεγε) or “what he taught” (ἐδίδαξε). Plato
deliberately emphasizes the problem of textual interpretation that a metaphysics of flux creates
for Protagoras and the implications of this problem for the prospects that anyone will ever
believe in Protagoras’ Truth. Again at 171b, Socrates uses the phrase ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν (“out of the
things which he wrote”), emphasizing that it was what Protagoras left behind in writing that
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determines current beliefs about his thought. The perfect tense of γέγραφεν is well chosen in that
it indicates the effect of Protagoras’ past actions (writing) on the present time in which they are
interpreted. This would not be a problem if not for the damning combination of a metaphysics of
flux, which guarantees that no two people can experience or believe exactly the same thing, with
the Protagorean position that truth is determined by belief. These two positions guarantee that
after the death of Protagoras, there can be no one to believe in his version of the Truth, and it
must therefore be false.
This paradoxical position of Protagoras, that he wishes his book to be the only thing
resistant to flux, also reflects the central flaw of his philosophical position more broadly.
Protagoras wants the individual human to be the measure of truth, but he also wants this very
doctrine to be the only exception to itself. Plato hints strongly at the irony that infuses this
position when Protagoras says,
ἐγὼ γάρ φηµι µὲν τὴν Ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· µέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡµῶν εἶναι τῶν
τε ὄντων καὶ µή, µυρίον µέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ µὲν ἄλλα
ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα.71
I claim that the Truth remains as I have written it, for each of us is a measure of the
things that are and those that are not, but each thing differs from every other one in
myriad ways by this very thing, that for one person some things are and appear, whereas
for another person, others things do.
(Tht. 166d)
In two sentences, the paradox of Protagoras’ position is shown in microcosm by its implications
for hermeneutics: just as Protagoras’ only universal assertion, that man is the measure of all
things, is undercut by its own content, so too his desire for a stable and uniform text with a single
and invariant meaning is undercut by the content of the meaning he hopes it will have for
everyone: namely, that nothing has the same meaning for everyone!
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The text printed here differs from that of Duke et al. in capitalizing “Ἀλήθειαν.”
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Section III below outlines the prescriptions for a method of philosophical reading that
Socrates imparts to Theaetetus throughout the dialogue, especially in his examination of
Protagoras’ doctrines. Ironies abound for Protagoras with respect to this method of philosophical
reading, and Plato makes liberal use of them throughout the dialogue. The central irony is that
this philosophical reading, which is defined by a spirit of generosity to the author whom it
wishes to interpret, would solve the problems that Protagoras’ own relativist hermeneutics create
for the validity of his doctrines.
Indeed, Protagoras requires a hermeneutic method like the one Socrates practices, but his
own beliefs militate against such a method. Protagoras complains to Socrates at 166c, “When
talking about a pig or a baboon, you are not only acting like a pig yourself, but you also persuade
those listening to do this to my writings, which is to act improperly” (ὗς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους
λέγων οὐ µόνον αὐτὸς ὑνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ακούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράµµατά µου
ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν).
Protagoras makes what seems a very reasonable request: that his writings be treated with
respect, rather than bombarded with sophistical or unconsidered objections. It has already been
noted that Protagoras has an interest in having his texts interpreted correctly: if his doctrine is to
remain “true,” then by his own standard of truth, this doctrine (in its exact specifications) must
be believed by someone, and this requires a correct interpretation of Protagoras’ writings. A
correct interpretation follows from the desire to understand the author’s διάνοια or vouloir-dire,
but the reader who seeks this understanding is doomed from the start if each man is his own
measure and none are mutually commensurable. However, the more basic impulse behind
Protagoras’ desire for his writings not to be read in a porcine manner is the basic intention to
influence others with one’s own ideas. That Protagoras has this desire himself is evident:
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Socrates mocks him for declaring his truth “from the inner sanctum” (ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου, 162a) of
his book as though it were something deep and sacred. While urging Socrates not to make light
in a serious matter, Protagoras overlooks the playful nature to which the limitations of writing
relegate written philosophy.
But if Protagoras’ thoughts are to receive any of the serious study that he hopes for from
his readers, these readers will have to approach his texts with the assumption that something can
be learned from them, and this assumption is wholly opposed to Protagorean doctrine. If each
man is the measure of all things, then he has nothing to learn from any other. And if expertise is
equal among all people, a book entitled Truth should properly be titled Truth for Protagoras,
which would be a book of interest to no one but Protagoras himself. Socrates’ barb at 162a is
again relevant. There is no reason to examine the opinions of others and try to refute them if each
one is necessarily correct. And when the motivation to examine other people’s opinions has been
done away with, the possibility that some great thinkers may influence the ideas of others
follows right behind.

III. A Strategy of Philosophical Reading
Section II.3 above describes the hermeneutic relativism that follows from Protagoras’
human-measure thesis, and argues that this view of reading undermines the human-measure
thesis itself. Section III proposes an alternative manner of reading displayed in the Theaetetus,
one that can be reconstructed by attending to the spirit and techniques with which Socrates
approaches the task of interpreting what Protagoras has left behind in writing. There is a palpable
irony in this, since this manner of philosophical reading conflicts with the human-measure thesis,
and yet would free the human-measure thesis of the hermeneutic relativism it entails.
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Socrates repeatedly disavows that he has any knowledge of his own in the Theaetetus,
and insists that he is acting only as a midwife to the philosophical pregnancy of Theaetetus (149b,
161a). But what Socrates lacks in positive philosophical doctrine is made up for with a method
of interpretation which is distinct in both spirit and technique. Socrates demonstrates this
hermeneutic method not only in practice, as he leads Theaetetus in an application of his method
toward a text of Protagoras, but also by explicit, didactic discussion of its ways and manner. If
the aporetic Theaetetus does not portray the indoctrination of the young mathematician into any
specific philosophical beliefs, the dialogue may instead represent the education of its titular
character in the ways of philosophical reading.72 This education in the art of philosophical
reading is difficult to describe because it is more natural and practical than studied and
theoretical. It comes in the form of ad hoc advice rather than invariant general principles.
Nevertheless, I attempt in this section of the chapter to analyze and describe the method of
interpretation espoused and enacted by Socrates in the Theaetetus by identifying as far as
possible the method’s aim, the spirit that governs the method, and the specific techniques that the
method includes.
The primary aim of Socrates’ hermeneutical project, in my view, is to understand a text.
In the Theaetetus, particularly the dialogue’s first half, that text is the Truth of Protagoras.73
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The analysis of the περιτροπή (Section II above) argues that Socrates wins a metaphilosophical victory over
Protagoras (and perhaps Theodorus) for the role of Theaetetus’ mentor. Blondell 2002: 252 points out that
Theaetetus is one of the few interlocutors Plato pairs with Socrates who “can not only benefit personally from
Socratic testing, but enable Socrates to be productive without formally departing from an elenctic structure.” While
philosophical education is attempted by Socrates in many dialogues, there is a strong case to be made that he
succeeds in this instance.
73
Ford 1994 believes that the theme of interpretation in the dialogue limits itself to the interpretation of
philosophical fragments. While it is true that the interlocutors do not engage with the text of the Truth beyond the
quotation of the human-measure thesis, the defining characteristics of Socrates’ hermeneutic method are adaptable
to a greater diversity of literary items. Theaetetus claims to have read the human-measure thesis “many times”
(πολλάκις), which leaves open the strong possibility that he is conversant in the Truth as a whole and not simply its
κεφάλαιον (152a). Moreover, Socrates develops the small quotation into a sweeping metaphysical theory, so that
while the human-measure thesis remains the focus of the interpretation, the project has taken on the task of
interpreting a vast array of thoughts.
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While this aim of understanding would seem to be the obvious goal of any interpretive enterprise,
the word “understanding” is itself variably understood, and the understanding that Socrates
pursues is by no means conventional. Socrates never declares that “understanding” is his aim, but
he and Theaetetus are heavily invested in the project of figuring out what Protagoras “means” by
his human-measure thesis. The answer to the question “what does this mean?” is what I refer to
as the aim of understanding.74 This notion of understanding, the aim of Socrates’ hermeneutic
practices, is best described through a catalogue of the techniques used in service of it throughout
the dialogue.

III.I Philosophical Reading: Three Techniques
The first of these techniques is the immersion of the interpreter’s mind into the thoughts
that surround and support the text.75 The human-measure thesis is the simple statement that “man
is the measure of all things” (πάντων χρηµάτων µέτρον ἂνθρωπον εῖναι, 152a).76 Nevertheless,
Socrates will not be satisfied with understanding and attacking the bare doctrine in isolation from
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This question, or a variant of it, is found in these passages: 146d, 152d, 164d, 188d, 189c, and 191b.
Ford 1994 describes Socrates’ development of the “secret doctrine” and the theory of flux (which states that
nothing is “one” due to the universality of co-present opposites such as large and small) as allegorical interpretations
of the human-measure thesis. But the tenuous logical relationship between the theory of flux and the human-measure
thesis does not seem to support the idea that flux is represented as the meaning of the doctrine itself. Instead,
Socrates is giving Theaetetus a crash course in the very broad metaphysical notions under which the human-measure
thesis took on its original significance. Even if the human-measure thesis does not entail the theory of flux, it does
suggest that the properties of sensible phenomena are not stable or objective and do not strictly belong to those
sensibles themselves, but only in specific instances of their being perceived by a subject. This leads to several
questions about the nature of reality that anyone would consider significant, but that are not immediately raised by
the human-measure thesis itself. The philosophies that surround the doctrine, those of flux and “phenomenal
subjectivism,” help explain what is at stake in an inquiry into the human-measure thesis.
76
It is for Socrates, at any rate, who summarizes the meaning of the human-measure thesis in just one more sentence
not too much longer than the dictum itself at 152a. While analyses of the human-measure thesis by Chappell 2004
and Bostock 1988 show that even a pithy and straightforward phrase may contain many possible internal meanings,
Socrates’ method of reading instead attempts to handle this sort of ambiguity by an outward turn away from the
internal ambiguities of the words themselves and into the intellectual culture that produced them. See Chappell 2004:
57-58; Bostock 1988: 41-44.
75
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a larger system of philosophy, which provides support and context for it.77 Through his constant
attempts to reconstruct the thought of Protagoras and the vast secret tradition of flux, Socrates
makes clear that nothing short of a full immersion in the Protagorean philosophy from which the
human-measure thesis was generated will suffice as preparation for a criticism of the theory.78
From this a first inference about Socrates’ hermeneutics can be derived: understanding a text
requires more than a superficial understanding of the obvious signification of its words. To
understand a text is also to understand the philosophy that undergirds it and the author who
produced it. Already the rift between this method of reading and the relativist hermeneutics of
the human-measure thesis becomes clear. Whereas the hermeneutics of Protagoras accepts any
reading as true whether it is well or poorly informed, the Socratic method of philosophical
reading prizes awareness of the author’s intellectual milieu as an extra-human µέτρον capable of
judging the value of an interpretation.
The pursuit of hermeneutic understanding, according to Socrates, is thus promoted by the
broad but intensive orientation of the reader in the philosophy of the author. This is the first
technique of Socrates’ hermeneutic method. But acquainting oneself with the basic tenets and
ideas of an impersonal philosophical school or movement occludes the individual author of the
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The nature of Plato’s corpus, which comprises discrete dialogues that are heavily determined by unique characters
and dramatic settings, urges against adopting this exact strategy in the reading of Plato himself. Griswold 1986: 1516 and Gill 2002 contain persuasive arguments for treating each dialogue on its own terms without excessive
reference to others. This is not to say that one dialogue might not provide help in interpreting another, as I have
found the Phaedrus helpful in developing my interpretation of the Theaetetus here. However, a topic-level inquiry
(into “Plato’s epistemology,” for instance) that treats the entire corpus rather than the dialogue as an organic unit,
would be likely to elide important differences in dramatic setting between the dialogues and thereby fail to come to a
firm answer of Plato’s “views” on knowledge. For readers of Plato, a strong knowledge of classical Athens might be
the best analogue to Socrates’ immersing of Theaetetus into the doctrine of flux to aid in their reading of Protagoras.
78
Fine 1996 explains how the “secret doctrine” saves the human-measure thesis from obvious self-contradiction.
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text himself.79 Thus, the second technique of Socrates’ philosophical art of reading, the technique
of sympathetic impersonation, restores the individual author to a place of prominence.
On multiple occasions, Socrates, not content merely to imagine the arguments that
Protagoras or his advocate might deploy in defense or clarification of his positions, tries to hit
upon the very words Protagoras might use, and even to envision the details of his physical
appearance and bodily movements (171d). At least three times in the dialogue, Socrates turns
into an actor, using direct speech to vocalize the viewpoints of Protagoras specifically (165e), a
speaker who may be either Protagoras himself or τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ (“someone else [speaking]
in his defense”), or a generic speaker representing proponents of the belief that whatever seems
so is true to the one for whom it seems (158e). By taking on the character of Protagoras like an
actor in a drama, Socrates shows that before he is willing to subject the human-measure thesis to
a critical examination, he is first determined to reach an appreciation of Protagoras’ thought in all
its original nuance and force.80 The aim is to come as close as possible to understanding
Protagoras’ ideas in precisely the same manner as the deceased philosopher himself conceived
them.
From 166a-168c, Socrates delivers the dialogue’s longest speech, consistently
maintaining the character of Protagoras for its entire duration. Even Theodorus, a student of
Protagoras who remains mostly loyal to his teacher, lauds this performance by assuring Socrates
that he “assisted [Protagoras] altogether youthfully” (πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας,
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This point is especially true in the case of Socrates’ education of Theaetetus about those who join Protagoras by
advancing his “secret doctrine” in their own writings. The philosophies of relativism and flux are found not just in
Protagoras, Heraclitus, and their philosophical kindred, but in sources spanning the leading figures in every genre of
literature (152e-153d).
80
Zwicky 1997 suggests such notion as “address” and “dialogue with the dead” as solutions to the problem that the
absence of the author poses for textual interpretation, as discussed in the final pages of the Phaedrus. Zwicky’s
reading of the Phaedrus — a deeply insightful and persuasive one —focuses only on the importance of these
practices for the writer of philosophy. In the Theaetetus, Socrates literally paves the way for dialogue with the dead
by calling Protagoras back from the grave to participate in a defense of his writings.
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168c). This extended speech on behalf (and in the character) of Protagoras exhibits and clarifies
the spirit of Socrates’ hermeneutic strategy. This spirit is distinguished by a thoroughgoing
generosity to the author.81 In both form and content, the exercise reveals that its aim is to
reconnect the interpreters with Protagoras himself, starting out from his written words, but
refusing to stop with them. Through the mouth of the actor Socrates, Protagoras issues a
reminder that if a critic of his theory refutes a surrogate Protagoras, as Socrates has just done
multiple times (163b, 164d, 165d) with Theaetetus standing in for the philosopher, then
Protagoras himself has not been refuted. If the surrogate and Protagoras would answer differently,
a refutation of the latter cannot be effected through discourse with the former. Socrates is intent
on refuting Protagoras ipse rather than a strawman version of his arguments, an inadequate
stand-in for the philosopher, or the words in isolation of the man.82
The absence of the author (especially in the case of the dead Protagoras) does impose
limitations on the technique of sympathetic impersonation. These limitations are encountered at
171d, where Socrates finally demands an inward turn so that the discussants can develop their
own thoughts and opinions. But it is important that this occurs only after an exhaustive and
elaborate process of re-animation, by which the thoughts represented by the text are made far
more vivid than a less zealous and generous method of reading would have allowed. Protagoras’
precise thoughts have certainly not been restored to their original form with perfect exactness.
But, what is more important, they have been strengthened, respected, and given the benefit of the
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This spirit of generosity and its manifestation in the technique of sympathetic impersonation should be
distinguished from the philosophical “principle of charity.” While both spring from a desire to bring out the best in a
text, Socrates’ method of reading is not so strictly utilitarian as readings built on the principle of charity. The
technique of sympathetic impersonation in Socrates’ method of philosophical reading is based in sympathy and the
effort to reanimate the author himself. Perhaps the method’s tacit assumption is that the strongest reading of a text
will only result from a reading which follows this humanizing approach.
82
Compare Tht. 154d, where Socrates alludes to Euripides’ Hippolytus in distinguishing between the refutation of a
“tongue” and a “mind” (cf. Hipp. 611-612 with discussion at Barrett 1964: 273-274). Socrates is less interested in
refuting the words of Protagoras than in refuting the mind of the man who spoke them.
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doubt. Socrates’ reanimation of Protagoras may not have conclusively recovered the author’s
thoughts, but it has made certain that Socrates is neither tilting at windmills nor flicking over
strawmen.
Following immersion in the author’s intellectual milieu and sympathetic impersonation of
the author, the third technique of Socrates’ method of philosophical reading is the assumption
that the author to be interpreted was wise. “It is likely that a wise man is not being foolish, so
let’s follow him” (Εἰκὸς µέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα µὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωµεν οὖν αὐτῷ), Socrates
says to Theaetetus at 152b. “It is very likely then since he is older that he is wiser than us” (εἰκὸς
γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡµῶν εἶναι), he repeats at 171d. At 157d, Socrates
explains to Theaetetus that he has been “serving up each of the wise things to be tasted”
(παρατίθηµι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύεσθαι) as part of his midwife’s work. The Theaetetus
demonstrates in clear terms that Socrates is no follower or worshipper of Protagoras.
Nevertheless, he fashions himself in his capacity as a reader and interpreter into a role of
subordination to and admiration of the author and interpretee, Protagoras. His generous and
earnest hermeneutic spirit reveals an obligation that the philosophical reader owes to the wise
author: the obligation to give the author the benefit of the doubt when interpreting his written
work or the tradition that his writings have inspired. This is done by recognizing that if the
argument seems silly or obviously mistaken, the interpreter must look deeper and try to imagine
how the author would defend his ideas if he were present.
The assumption of a wise author leads to the strategy of generous reading, and this
strategy ensures that the consequent interpretation will be valuable in two ways: first, that one’s
interpretation will be maximally productive, and second, that if the text must be criticized or
refuted, this refutation will be legitimate, fair, and convincing, unlike a refutation based on an
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inferior understanding of the original text. It is unclear on exactly what basis Socrates prefers the
hermeneutics of generosity. Nevertheless, I argue here that Socrates’ hermeneutic spirit is
validated by its consequences, which include an interpretation that is more productive than one
guided by an ungenerous reading and a refutation that is more convincing than those produced
by shallower, less generous methods. Alternatively, it may be a matter of principle that a great
philosopher such as Protagoras deserves an adequate defender of his “orphan” writings.83 This is
intimated by Socrates’ comment at Tht. 164e: ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσοµεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ’
αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν, “But we ourselves will probably have to help [the orphan] for the sake of what is
just.”

III.2 Productivity as a Hermeneutic Virtue
The first of these two virtues of a generous reading must be clarified. What does it mean
to say that one interpretation of a text is more or less productive than another? The productivity
of an interpretation is largely determined by the degree to which the interpretation succeeds in
bringing the interpreter’s own thoughts to light. Section I.3 above argued that the purpose of the
dice paradox at 154a was to suggest that the text may act as the measure of a reader’s intellectual
development by staying constant itself each time a reader returns to re-visit its words. This is one
example of a larger trend in the Theaetetus of Socrates and Theaetetus examining external
matters intently before ultimately turning back to reflect on themselves. Scholarship on the
dialogue has made ample note of this pattern, although the language used to express it has
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See Phaedrus 275e for the criticism of writing as existing beyond the creative act of its author, such that it comes
to be “orphaned” of its father who could defend it against critics.
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varied.84 It would, therefore, be harmonious with the dialogue’s tendency to promote a
hermeneutic turn to the self to suggest that a successful and revealing self-interpretation is one of
the benefits of a generous interpretive method.
In terming this benefit the “productivity” of an interpretation, I have taken my cue from
Socrates’ speech at 150c, which uses the word γόνιµον in a very prominent place in Socrates’
explanation of his art of intellectual midwifery: µέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔνι τῇ ἡµετέρᾳ τέχνῃ,
βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια
ἢ γόνιµον τε καὶ ἀληθές, “This is the greatest thing in my art, the ability to examine whether the
thought born of the young man is in every way an image and false or whether it is productive and
true” (150c).
Even though it is not immediately clear what the midwife’s most important function is,
this passage in 150c has generated a surprisingly sparse amount of commentary. This is even
more surprising given the emphasis Socrates places on it (“the greatest thing in my art”).
Translations show considerable variance in their rendering of γόνιµον and thus in their
understanding of this passage. Published translations of γόνιµον include “genuine,” “fruitful,”
“noble,” “generated,” and “viable.”85 The “genuine” of Fowler’s and McDowell’s translations
works on two levels. First, it joins the ἀληθές parallel to γόνιµον in stressing that the art of
intellectual midwifery examines an idea to see whether it is correct, and second, it extends the
image of the anatomical midwife by playing on the sense of γόνιµος which means “born in
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Ford 1994: 212 notes that “The result of these sallies in interpretation, then, is to abandon the search for what
Protagoras exactly meant to say by these words and to use them as a springboard for examining the interlocutors’
own ideas”; see also Ambuel 2015: 75. Blondell 2002: 252 states: “Through the characters and their interactions,
abstract epistemological issues are shown to play themselves out in the world of specific, particularized human
beings, with their varied abilities to learn from the world, themselves, and each other.” Roochnik 2002: 50 notes the
dialogue teaches that “we must think ourselves to be selves;” later, that the dialogue systematically thematizes the
process of self-recognition through the frequent use of Socrates and Theaetetus as examples (45-46).
85
For example: “genuine” (Fowler 1921; McDowell 1973); “fruitful” (Benardete 1984); “noble” (Chappell 2004);
“generated” (Sachs 2004); and “viable” (Ambuel 2015).
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lawful wedlock” (LSJ, s.v. γόνιµος, def. A.3.b).86 Ambuel’s “viable” does similar work, by
weakly continuing the metaphor of the midwife (babies and propositions may both be tested for
their “viability”) while also taking γόνιµον as a semantic ally with ἀληθές.87
Two translations, belonging to Benardete and Sachs, appear more eccentric than the three
discussed above. But by assigning a distinct meaning to γόνιµον, their translations—Benardete’s
fruitful and Sachs’ generated—treat the two adjectives as more than just playful pleonasm. Each
finds a new way to extend the image of the midwife, and each carries implications for the
question of what “the most important thing” in Socrates’ art of intellectual midwifery might be.
By describing an idea as generated, Sachs thinks Socrates means one that is “true-born, or truly
one’s own thinking.”88 Sachs later suggests that Socrates lists all the proponents of the secret
doctrine of flux to name the “seminal thinkers” responsible for the philosophical pregnancy of
Theaetetus.89 On Sachs’ reading, γόνιµον would therefore represent the virtue of a philosophical
idea that had mixed one’s own ideas in proper proportion with those of great and influential
thinkers.
This reading of the enigmatic γόνιµον and the meaning of its passage accords well with
the dialogue’s featured theme of textual interpretation and with the dialogue’s teaching that a
successful textual interpretation must always be accompanied by a parallel self-interpretation.
However, Benardete’s translation of γόνιµον to mean fruitful can add still more to this picture.
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I am not certain that either translator intended for genuine to extend the image of the midwife by punning on
“legitimate,” but the double meaning is present. McDowell 1973: 116 does clarify in his commentary that he either
takes γόνιµος to be effectively synonymous with ἀληθές or to be a less important word than ἀληθές for the
interpretation of the passage. McDowell’s commentary notes that Socrates claims that as a midwife he can test a
thesis for correctness, but it makes no mention of his capacity as a judge of genuineness, and likely subsumes the
notion of genuineness under that of correctness.
87
As with McDowell, Ambuel 2015: 28 clarifies in his commentary his reading of the passage, which again either
assimilates γόνιµος to ἀληθές or focuses on the latter to the exclusion of the former: “This makes the most important
part of Socrates’ art not the delivery, but the subsequent separating of the true from the false.”
88
Sachs 2004: 27.
89
Sachs 2004: 31.

92

An interpretation that is generated in Sachs’ sense is also fruitful since it has produced a deeper
understanding of both the text and one’s own beliefs.90

III.3 Objections and Replies
In the preceding paragraphs, I have traced the outline of an art of philosophical reading, a
certain interpretive method demonstrated by Socrates in the Theaetetus. This characterization
corresponds to Socrates’ words and actions through three specific hermeneutic techniques united
by a pervasive spirit of generosity. I can think of three objections that are likely to be voiced
against the claim that Socrates follows the method of philosophical reading I have described.
First, one might say that Socrates doesn’t mean it, that he is only indulging in his eponymous
irony when he describes Protagoras, his philosophical adversary, as “wise.” I do believe that
irony is present in these passages, but it does not exclude my interpretation.91 It has been widely
acknowledged that Socrates modifies his manner and message of speech to suit the unique
character of each of his interlocutors (this is the practice of psychagogia, described in the
Phaedrus at 261a). I believe that he is doing just that in these passages in the Theaetetus.
Socrates tells the young Theaetetus simply that the philosopher was wise (152b; 152c; 157d), but
he tells the older Theodorus that he was wise on account of his age (171d). What is the reason for
Socrates’ decision to mention Protagoras’ advanced age when speaking to Theodorus, but not to
Theaetetus? Whether Socrates’ comment to Theodorus is a sincere attempt at flattery or a
humorous and transparent one makes little difference; Socrates is appealing to Theodorus’ own
90

The final translation of γόνιµον is Chappell’s “noble” (Chappell 2004: 44), which is puzzling and not based in any
of senses of the word listed in LSJ 1996.
91
Cf. Ambuel 2015. Hyland 1995: 98-99 proposes that at least some instances of Socratic irony anticipate Hegelian
dialectic. Hyland’s “triadic” structure for Platonic irony is appropriate here. Socrates does mean to undermine the
supposed wisdom of Protagoras when he refers to him as σοφός. But the apparent complement is not entirely
negated by this, since the assumption of wisdom is an important hermeneutical assumption.
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age when he claims that Protagoras’ years make him wiser than those present. Regardless of
whether the comment is sincere or facetious, the practical effect of his appeal is paramount; by
playfully stressing the wisdom of Protagoras, Socrates appeals to Theodorus on a specific and
individual level in exhorting him to the task of seriously interpreting Protagoras’ text.
The second objection goes primarily toward the technique of the assumption of the
author’s wisdom, and opposes to this technique the counter that Socrates would be a fool to
follow it. Many books are written, many philosophical traditions exist, and to afford to each the
generosity and deference that Socrates does to Protagoras and his fellows-in-thought would
preclude the possibility of real learning or progress through philosophical reading. One would be
immobilized and incapacitated by the obligation to treat all ideas as serious and deserving of an
equal amount of generosity and respect. But Socrates advocates a selective hermeneutics of
generosity, not an indiscriminate one.92 Indeed, Socrates is impelled to praise Theaetetus’ first
definition of knowledge as οὐ φαῦλον (“not trivial”) precisely because it is the definition ὃν
ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας (“which Protagoras also said,” 151e). The definition stakes a claim to
some initial credibility because of its similarity to the ideas of Protagoras, a great and influential
philosopher whose ideas merit serious consideration.93 It is perhaps only figures like Protagoras,
whose writings have obvious merit on account of their influence, whom Socrates finds worthy of
a full hermeneutic treatment, one infused with a generosity, patience, and painstaking effort that
cannot be doled out to just any text.
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Cf. Sedley 2004: 33. Sedley assigns to “the midwife’s toolkit” the ability “to distinguish which objects of an
investigation can and which cannot be studied by his art.” While Sedley means here the ability to distinguish
between objects that admit of a priori investigation and those that do not, a reading of the dialogue that recognizes
its focus on interpretation would find that the intellectual midwife is more likely to distinguish between texts that
would hold up to the rigors of Socrates’ interpretive method.
93
That Theaetetus has become philosophically pregnant by Protagoras is a consequence of his influence.
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In addition to the fact that Socrates’ assumption of wisdom is selective rather than
indiscriminate, there is another reason to believe that this technique is valuable to the
philosopher who practices it. Moreover, the reason comes from Socrates himself, as he cautions
Alcibiades to follow something very much like the assumption of wisdom in Alcibiades I.
Carpenter and Polansky (2002) have reasoned that an elenctic refutation of Alcibiades in
Alcibiades I supports the principle of method that one’s opponent must not be underestimated
(Alcibiades I 118b-c).94 Socrates convinces Alcibiades to assume that his competitors, the
Spartan generals and the Persian King, are formidable (δεινός). Under this assumption,
Alcibiades will cultivate himself, which is recognized as a “big help.”
Since Socrates has singled out Protagoras for refutation in the Theaetetus, he finds
himself occupying the same position relative to Protagoras that Alcibiades occupied toward his
political rivals. Following the logic of Alcibiades I, it is therefore in Socrates’ interest to assume
that Protagoras is wise and skilled in his writings and teachings, because Socrates will construct
better arguments against him under this assumption. It is also significant and harmonious with
the findings of this study that the benefits of this assumption redound to one’s self; in the end it
is Alcibiades who becomes better cultivated as a result of his assumption that his competitors are
δεινός, and Socrates who becomes a better opponent in argument as a result of his assumption
that Protagoras is wise.95
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Carpenter and Polansky 2002: 95-97.
A prominent view related to Socratic elenchus should be expressed here, because it speaks to Socrates’ practical
stake in the assumption of wisdom and its selective deployment. Bickhouse and Smith 1994: 18-19 argue that it is
only by elenchus that Socrates is justified in his positive beliefs on moral questions. After refuting a great variety of
people who do not share his own views by elenchi which reveal inconsistencies in their thought, he can conclude
inductively that his own set of moral beliefs is the only one that is consistent. But the inductive nature of the
conclusion requires that it be continuously tested, and Socrates’ confidence in his own moral positions depends on
his successful elenctic practice. It is natural that the wise would be the most suitable subjects for this practice. If
Socrates knows of a wise man he has not refuted, then he must suspend his confidence in his moral beliefs. A more
skeptical presentation of the same line of reasoning is presented in Vlastos 1983: 713-714. One detriment to many of
these interpretations of Socratic elenchus is their exclusive focus on the “early dialogues,” despite Socrates’
95
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A third potential objection is that Socrates’ reverence for the supposedly wise is out of
character with his irreverent and ironic manner in the rest of Plato’s dialogues, and even in the
Theaetetus itself. Plato’s Socrates is an iconoclast with a penchant for demonstrating precisely
that the supposedly wise are in fact not so through the elenchus. A hermeneutics of generosity
propelled by the assumption of wisdom appears to be incongruous with Socrates’ zetetic
skepticism and with his signature philosophical method of elenchus.
The assumption of wisdom, however, is provisional and temporary rather than conclusive
and final. As has been made clear elsewhere in this chapter, interpretation is presented in the
Theaetetus as a project which always leads toward and terminates in self-interpretation. A
successful act of philosophical reading must bring the self to bear as a standard against the text
one is interpreting and in turn apply the text as a measure of the self. Since one’s own thoughts
and beliefs are always the final word in an act of interpretation, and since they will invariably
differ from the thoughts that lie beneath (διάνοια) the text one is interpreting,96 every act of
interpretation must inevitably reach beyond pure passivity and acquiescence to the text in
question.
With this established, we are now better positioned to understand the sense in which
Eucleides, the character of the Theaetetus’ prologue who has committed the dialogue into textual
form, is held up by Plato as a negative exemplum for literary philosophical activity. Eucleides
tells Terpsion that he has repeatedly traveled back and forth from Megara to Athens to ensure

continued presence and elenctic activity in many of the dialogues that fall outside this group as it has been
constructed. In fact, I consider it a strong possibility that much of the supposedly positive, Platonic teaching that
occurs in the “middle” and “late” dialogues is truly refutative in nature. This is how Gadamer 1980: 37 understands
the proofs of immortality presented in the Phaedo: “Thus the point of the demonstrations, it seems to me, is that they
refute doubts and not that they justify belief.”
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Even in the case of two people with great similarity of belief, there are certain to be differences that become
apparent eventually. Even Socrates and Theaetetus, who share all the same facial features, are still not identical to
one another (143e-144a). This same rift between the author’s διάνοια and the reader’s understanding of his text is
also what underlies the literary aspect of the περιτροπή, discussed in Section II.3 of this chapter.
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that the transcript he writes down of Socrates’ conversation with Theaetetus, Theodorus, and the
ghost of Protagoras comes as near as possible to perfect historical accuracy (143a). But by the
standards of Socrates’ art of midwifery, the product of Eucleides’ philosophic activity would be
a lifeless wind-egg; he has, at best, passively repeated the same words told to him by Socrates
without mixing any of his own element into the composition.
The result places him in a position equivalent to that of Theaetetus at the moment he
offers his first definition of knowledge, when it was the undiluted thought of Protagoras without
any of Theaetetus’ own contribution mixed in (152a). The final line of the dramatic frame brings
out Eucleides’ ironic status as a creator who lacks creativity: Eucleides orders his slave to read
the text aloud, but the core of the sentence that constitutes this command is simply παῖ, λέγε
(“Child, read,” 143c). Although παῖ is the vocative address used by Eucleides to catch his slave’s
attention, this address also applies to the text Eucleides has so meticulously prepared — the
offspring of his foray into philosophical writing.97 But just like Theaetetus, the text resembles
Socrates more than its own father (143e), since it has come verbatim from his lips through
Eucleides as a passive conduit. This passive, uncreative example of literary philosophy with
which Plato introduces the Theaetetus represents the danger of sycophantism and dogmatic
listlessness. Far from encouraging this mindset in the reader of a philosophical text, Plato warns
against it resoundingly as his opening move in the Theaetetus.
The third objection therefore fails to show an inconsistency of this method of
philosophical reading with the character of Socrates as portrayed in the Socratic dialogues.
Indeed, the Socratic method of reading is, in the end, one that prizes a self-focused and personal
learning experience that moves beyond an uncritical reverence for the author. The Socratic
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On the “genealogical” relationship of author to text, see Svenbro 1988: 3; 64-108. See also Phaedrus 257b; 275e
and Theaetetus 164e.
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method of textual interpretation is as well-suited to elenchus as the Socratic method of
conversation, as Socrates eventual refutation of Protagoras in the Theaetetus demonstrates. But
in conversation as well as interpretation, refutation is only convincing once the interlocutor has
been given ample opportunity to express his viewpoint and make it known. Far from
encouraging sycophantism, which truly would be uncharacteristic of Plato’s Socrates, the
assumption of wisdom facilitates the refutation of those assumed to be wise.

Philosophical Reading: Towards a Conclusion
In this chapter, I have extended the discussion of writing in the Theaetetus to embrace
new territory in the main body of the dialogue. Three distinct usages of µέτρον and its
derivatives have been identified and compared. This discussion revealed the problem of
incommensurability inherent in Protagorean relativism and suggested that Socrates sees the
written text as a measure of its reader. This problem of incommensurability was then highlighted
as the crux of Socrates’ metaphilosophical defeat of Protagoras in the περιτροπή, an argument
which, according to my analysis, is strengthened by a less explicit parallel that took as its starting
point the textual status of the deceased Protagoras’ doctrines. Lastly, the framework of a Socratic
style of philosophical reading was described. This style of reading is an alternative to the
relativistic hermeneutics that were implied by, but also a great threat to, Protagoras’ humanmeasure thesis. With this subtle and wide-ranging argument, Socrates has used the written text, a
great interest of the bookish Theaetetus, as the site for a demonstration of the superiority of
philosophical thought to sophistical thought. Only under the assumption of the possibility of a
common measure between writer and reader can the text reach its full potential for
communication and self-reflection.
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